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Financial stability is a state in which the financial system, including key financial markets and financial institutions, is 
capable of withstanding economic shocks and can fulfil its key functions smoothly, i.e. intermediating financial resources, 
managing financial risks and processing payment transactions.
The Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s fundamental interest and joint responsibility with other government institutions is to maintain 
and promote the stability of the domestic financial system. The role of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank in the maintenance of 
financial stability is defined by the Central Bank Act. 
The Magyar Nemzeti Bank facilitates and strengthens financial stability using all the tools at its disposal and, should the 
need arise, manages the impact of shocks. As part of this activity, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank undertakes a regular and 
comprehensive analysis of the macroeconomic environment, the operation of the financial markets, domestic financial 
intermediaries and the financial infrastructure, reviewing risks which pose a threat to financial stability and identifying 
the components and trends which increase the vulnerability of the financial system. 
The primary objective of the Report on Financial Stability is to inform stakeholders about the topical issues related to 
financial stability, and thereby raise the risk awareness of those concerned as well as maintain and strengthen confidence 
in the financial system. Accordingly, it is the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s intention to ensure the availability of the information 
needed for financial decisions, and thereby make a contribution to increasing the stability of the financial system as a 
whole. 
The analyses in this Report were prepared by the Financial Stability, Financial Analysis, Monetary Strategy and Economic 
Analysis as well as the Payments and Securities Settlements Directorates, under the general direction of Márton Nagy, 
Director. The project was managed by Tamás Balás, senior economist of Financial Stability. The Report was approved for 
publication by the Executive Board of the MNB.
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overall assessment
Key risks:
1.  strong outflow of external funds in regional comparison 
continues or accelerates, as a result of the following:
 1.1.  stronger deleveraging in the euro area banking sector;
 1.2.  persistently weak or further deteriorating ability of 
domestic banks to attract capital and funds.
2.  High reliance of the banking sector on the fX swap market 
results in significant vulnerability:
 2.1.  liquidity buffers may shrink due to the depreciation 
of HUf;
 2.2.  the substitution of external funds to predominantly 
short-term fX swap exposure results in growing 
maturity mismatches;
 2.3.  central bank interventions against fX swap market 
turbulences may lower foreign exchange reserves.
3.  further deterioration in corporate portfolio quality may 
significantly weaken the banking sector’s lending capacity:
 3.1.  the npl portfolio diverts a vast amount of funds from 
new lending;
 3.2.  it does not create income, and thus impairs the ability 
to accumulate capital and attract external funds.
 
Risk mitigating measures:
1.1.  Maintaining prudent domestic fiscal policy, further credible 
reduction of government debt.
1.2.  Earliest possible conclusion of the EU/IMF negotiations and 
strengthening parent bank commitment in funding domestic 
subsidiaries.
1.3.  Restoration of the banking sector’s ability to accumulate 
capital and generate income, improvement of competitiveness.
2.  Regulatory intervention may be needed to impede a rapid, 
significant build-up of the banking sector’s on-balance-sheet 
open position. This may mitigate the financial stability risks 
posed by the business model that provides FX liquidity via the 
FX swap market.
 
3. Accelerated portfolio cleaning requires:
 • faster insolvency procedures,
 • facilitating the transfer of collaterals,
 •  dismantling barriers to efficient corporate restructuring (e.g. 
tax policies),
 •  improving the efficiency of out-of-court agreements.
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 4.1. Measures of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank for stimulating lending: 
 • two-year collateralized lending facility,
 •  easing eligibility criteria of collaterals for central bank 
operations,
 •  adopting  a universal model for mortgage covered bond 
issuance and relaunching the central bank mortgage bond 
purchase programme.
4.2.  Further increase of the guarantee programmes’ capacity, in 
order to facilitate lending to the SME sector.
4.  credit supply constraints can be still attributed to a 
reduced willingness to lend, but deteriorating lending 
capacity stemming particularly from above mentioned 
liquidity considerations raises the risk of a credit crunch, 
mainly in the corporate sector.
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The autumn issue of the Report on Financial Stability identified several key 
risks, the size of which have declined considerably as a result of interventions 
by the government and the central bank. In terms of the negative effects of 
early repayment of households’ foreign exchange loans, supply pressure on 
the forint exchange rate was mitigated by the central bank by using part of 
the foreign exchange reserves via spot tenders. In order to reduce the risks 
of insufficient retail price competition, based on the proposal of the HFSA 
and the central bank, the government set up a complete credit registry 
system for the household segment and made the pricing of household 
mortgage loan products more transparent. In addition, as a result of capital 
injections by parent banks, the capital position of the domestic banking 
sector strengthened; consequently, from the capital side the risks of a 
deterioration in shock-absorbing capacity, and thus a weakening of the ability 
to lend, declined materially. The risks related to the sovereign debt crisis of 
euro area periphery countries remain elevated, despite the fiscal and 
monetary steps which have been taken. In the domestic banking sector, 
there is still a risk of inefficient management of non-performing loan 
portfolios. Moreover, this risk is becoming increasingly pronounced in the 
corporate sector.
External funds in the banking sector decreased significantly last year. In part, 
this is a natural process, as a consequence of contraction in loans outstanding. 
Nevertheless, there is a rising risk that the outflow of funds will become the 
cause rather than the consequence of subdued domestic lending. Given that 
the dynamics of outflow are very high by regional standards, and that the 
outflow leads to a build-up of FX swap exposure, this points to an excessive 
outflow of external funds. Subsidiaries decrease their external funds in many 
cases before the maturity of their foreign currency assets. Thus, HUF 
liquidity is depleted through FX swap markets to obtain foreign currency. A 
steady outflow of external funds is a key risk due to the following two 
underlying reasons: the deleveraging of the euro area banking sector and the 
low competitiveness in terms of profitability of the domestic banking sector, 
coupled with its ability to attract capital. 
The deleveraging of the European banking sector is partly a healthy process, 
as neither the current market nor the regulatory environment supports the 
high leverage that was previously built up. However, the pace of deleveraging 
can be considered as a significant risk. As a result of the Greek debt 
restructuring and the 3-year loan tender of the ECB, the risk of excessive 
deleveraging and a credit crunch was mitigated significantly. Nevertheless, 
these risks remain elevated due to the unfavourable funding conditions, as 
well as tighter capital adequacy requirements by regulatory authorities 
(Basel 2.5 and III) and markets. 
In 2011, the Hungarian banking sector booked substantial losses, mostly due 
to one-off items. Looking forward, the persistently uncertain operating and 
regulatory environment may prove to be a significant disadvantage in 
competition for external funds. Excluding these effects, underlying 
profitability is rather favourable. Income losses, stemming from a decrease 
in well-performing loans (an outcome of the early repayment scheme of 
foreign currency mortgage loans), may be offset by a lower bank levy, 
ceasing one-off profitability shocks and moderating loan losses. If a high 
interest margin can prevail, the profitability of the banking sector may 
Many of the risks identified in the 
previous Report on Financial Stability 
have decreased
accelerated outflow of external funds 
from the domestic banking sector may 
become the cause of subdued lending
pace of the deleveraging in the 
european banking sector is a risk 
factor 
the currently low competitiveness of 
the domestic banking sector in terms 
of profitability needs to be restored 
over the medium term
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improve over the medium term, which is of key importance in terms of the 
regional allocation of funds. 
Hungary’s net external debt may decrease in the future, which could, in turn, 
mitigate the country’s vulnerability. The model shift in funding of the state 
and the banking system entails a greater reliance on domestic savings in 
order to reduce reliance on external funds. This does not mean that the 
banking system should operate without external funding, but that heavy 
reliance on such funds needs to be reduced. The fact that the growth of 
domestic savings is slow and that the outflow of external funds is fast renders 
the shift difficult. This leads to strong deleveraging and growth sacrifice. In 
turn, this may affect concerns about the sustainability of sovereign debt. A 
steep fall in net external debt triggered by an accelerating outflow of foreign 
funds from the banking system would be rather unwelcome. An EU/IMF 
agreement could serve as a safety net, mitigate the country’s sensitivity to 
risk premium shocks and reduce the funding costs of the state and the 
banking system, while facilitating an orderly balance sheet adjustment in the 
banking sector. The latter could be supported by a stronger parent bank 
commitment associated with an EU/IMF agreement. 
Key risks related to the outflow of external funds are the surging on-balance-
sheet foreign exchange position and the FX swap exposure hedging it. The FX 
swap exposure peaked at a historic record in early 2012, which is mainly 
attributable to the fact that foreign currency funding through FX swap 
markets is an accepted business model as of 2008. However, the high FX 
swap exposure entails considerable financial stability risks, not just because 
swap markets have dried up in the past on several occasions, but also 
because even in a well-functioning swap market meaningful risks can be 
identified. Roll-over needs and margin call requirements increase the 
exchange rate sensitivity of banks, which may lead to lower liquidity. Heavier 
reliance on swap markets may also interfere with maturity transformation, 
because the average original maturity of swap deals is shorter than that of 
foreign funds. Turbulence in the swap market may also increase reliance on 
the MNB, which, in turn, could result in a reduction of FX reserves. To 
mitigate these risks, introduction of regulation is worth considering in order 
to prevent rapid build-up of sizeable FX swap exposure.
Non-performing corporate loans continued to increase in 2011 H2. Accounting 
for restructured loans as well, the impaired ones comprise one quarter of the 
total loan portfolio. With a steady increase in the share of non-performing 
loans, Hungary diverged from the Visegrád countries, with its ratio being 
among the highest in Europe. Looking ahead, the share of non-performing 
corporate loans may continue to increase over the next two years due to the 
contraction in lending, slow portfolio cleaning and subdued economic 
outlook. Fundamentally, deterioration in the corporate loan portfolio poses 
risks on the liquidity side rather than on the capital side. Provisions for non-
performing portfolios and the capital buffer are sufficient to absorb losses. 
At the same time, over the longer term, the funding of non-performing loans 
may limit the liquidity and profitability of banks due to lost interest income, 
which may result in a weaker ability to attract foreign funds. 
conclusion of an eU/iMf agreement 
and stronger parent bank commitment 
are key to prevent excessive 
deleveraging
High fX swap exposure adds to 
liquidity risks to an extent that may 
necessitate regulatory intervention
steady portfolio quality deterioration 
in the corporate segment 
fundamentally weakens lending 
capacity in terms of liquidity
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Accelerating the portfolio cleaning of non-performing corporate loans or 
recoveries from impairment through reorganisation are key factors for a 
rebound in lending. The former is impeded by the low demand of domestic 
and foreign companies specialising in work-out; therefore, the focus should 
be on restoring solvency in the case of viable business models. The greatest 
obstacle in this regard is the regulatory environment, which now drives work-
out in the direction of liquidation proceedings. In order to avoid this, the 
obstacles to efficient restructuring (for example tax rules) should be 
removed and the possibility of out-of-court agreements should be expanded, 
in line with best international practices. In the event that liquidation is 
unavoidable, it would be necessary to improve the efficiency and transparency 
of procedures, facilitate the transfer of collaterals and reduce related costs. 
The proportion of non-performing loans in the household segment is 
expected to increase further in early 2012, which is partly attributable to the 
considerable decrease in well-performing loans (as a result of the early 
repayment scheme) and partly attributable to slow portfolio cleaning. 
However, from mid-2012 on, the exchange rate cap scheme will considerably 
reduce the probability of default of foreign currency mortgage loans. Thus, 
the ratio of NPLs will peak at close to 15 percent in early 2013. Concurrently 
with the probability of default, loan loss provisioning may also fall. An 
important tool of managing outstanding non-performing loans could be the 
adoption of a personal insolvency legislation, which can, as international 
practice reveals, accelerate portfolio cleaning significantly. 
As a result of a capital injection of approximately HUF 370 billion by parent 
banks at end-2011 and early 2012, the shock-absorbing capacity of the 
banking sector has improved markedly. However, the distribution of the 
capital buffer continues to show strong asymmetry; accordingly, some banks 
need a capital injection already in the baseline scenario. In the stress 
scenario, a capital injection of HUF 83 billion (a lower amount than in the 
previous stress test) is needed to comply with the minimum regulatory 
capital. The capital need for the stress scenario affects only a few banks and 
is of a manageable size. 
The domestic banking sector must comply with two regulatory liquidity 
indicators: as of January the short-term liquidity indicators and, as of June, 
the foreign exchange funding adequacy ratio (FFAR). Banks are in compliance 
with the required short-term liquidity indicators, ensuring adequate shock-
absorbing capacity. It is reflected in the fact that, even under stress, each 
bank would be liquid; however, the proportionate regulatory surplus of total 
assets would fall almost 4 percent short of the 10 percent requirement, 
which would result in considerable funding needs or deleveraging. A real 
threat emerges as foreign currency liquidity needs would account for 4 
percent of total assets, posing a material risk due to the vulnerability of swap 
markets which ensure exchangeability among currencies. Scarce foreign 
exchange liquidity, exacerbated by the outflow of external funds, may 
strongly constrain lending.
Since the start of the crisis, the corporate loan market has been characterised 
by steady deleveraging. This has been due, to a large extent, to credit supply 
constraints. However, it cannot yet be considered a credit crunch, which 
leads to the destruction of production capacities through the bankruptcy of 
efficiency of portfolio resolution must 
be improved 
Deterioration in household portfolio 
quality may come to a halt
as a result of capital injections by 
parent banks, credit risk stress tests 
indicate strong shock-absorbing 
capacity
the liquidity stress test indicates 
adequate shock absorbing capacity, 
but foreign currency liquidity is 
scarce, which may impede lending
corporate lending is characterised by 
exacerbated credit contraction
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viable enterprises. Nevertheless, even the current level of credit contraction 
is detrimental, because it results in the postponement or cancellation of new 
investments intended to replace or improve amortised capacities. Due to a 
further decline in willingness to take risks and strong outflows of external 
funds, companies are facing tighter credit conditions, which are also 
confirmed by our latest lending survey. Accordingly, the corporate lending 
forecast was revised further downward; an upswing is thus expected to take 
place only from end-2013 on. As the outflow of external funds is becoming 
the cause of deleveraging to a larger extent, the risk of a credit crunch is 
rising.
The most important factor in lending to households was the early repayment 
of foreign currency loans at a preferential exchange rate at end-2011, which 
resulted in a nearly one-quarter contraction in outstanding foreign currency 
mortgage loans. Although the second exchange rate cap and measures 
related to non-performing household debtors may improve banks’ willingness 
and capacity to lend, it requires substantial operational capacities from 
banks. Over the short term, capacity constraints may hinder new lending in 
the household segment; consequently, any material increase in lending may 
only be expected after the conclusion of these programmes. As principal 
repayments remain large-scale, an increase in household loans outstanding is 
expected only from end-2013 on.
The MNB considers the improvement of the Hungarian banking sector’s 
stability and ability to lend to be important; therefore, it announced a 
threefold package in March 2012. The most important element of the 
package is a two-year collateralised loan tender with a monthly frequency 
and variable interest rate on the prevailing central bank discount rate. 
Recourse to this facility may reduce deteriorating lending capacity stemming 
from forint liquidity. As the second element, the central bank further 
expanded the range of eligible collateral for central bank operations to also 
ease liquidity constraints. Lastly, the acceptance of the proposal on 
introduction of universal mortgage covered bond issuance, an important tool 
in improving maturity mismatches in household mortgage lending, is intended 
to improve market liquidity with the relaunch of a mortgage covered bond 
purchase programme. While the first two instruments may facilitate an 
upturn in corporate lending, the third one may contribute to a rebound in 
household lending.
Rebound in lending to households may 
take place, following the resolution of 
problems related to outstanding loans 
the Magyar nemzeti bank is ready to 
facilitate lending via numerous 
measures at its disposal
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1  the operating environment  
of domestic financial institutions
1.1  stronger deleveraging of the euro area 
banking sector is a risk
the period since the previous Report on financial 
stability can be divided into two distinct parts. In 2011 
H2, in parallel with escalating sovereign and banking sector 
turmoil, market conditions deteriorated considerably. 
However, after the introduction of mechanisms for managing 
the sovereign debt crisis and the new unlimited liquidity 
facilities of ECB, significant improvement took place in early 
2012. 
elevated sovereign risks led to downgrading of several 
euro area countries. The risk of an extreme financial crisis 
increased considerably in 2011 H2. Investor confidence in 
euro area member states plummeted, as reflected in falling 
financial asset prices and surging risk premia (Chart 1). 
Weakened investor confidence culminated in domestic 
political crises in Italy and Greece. In the last quarter of 
2011, due to rising concerns over sovereign debt sustainability 
and declining economic growth, the credit ratings of many 
euro area countries were downgraded: Austria and France 
lost their triple-A ratings; Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal were 
downgraded into non-investment grade; and Greece was 
placed in the extreme speculative category. Within six 
months, the ‘voluntary’ write-off of private investors’ 
exposure vis-à-vis Greece grew from 20 percent to above 50 
percent at par value. 
International markets were characterised by significant volatility in the past half year. The protracted escalation of the 
sovereign debt crisis in the euro area due to shrinking risk appetite considerably worsened the funding conditions of 
European governments and banking sectors, as evidenced in reduced funding and surging risk premia. These negative 
trends were reversed in early 2012 by the second Greek rescue package, following the successful Greek bond exchange 
programme, and the liquidity injections of the ECB. The ECB significantly improved the longer-term funding of banks by 
two 3-year loan tenders at the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012. Even though the ECB’s steps significantly mitigated 
the risk of excessive deleveraging and a credit crunch in the European banking sector, risks remains. These are attributable 
to still unfavourable funding conditions and stricter capital adequacy requirements by the regulatory bodies and markets.
chart 1
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Due to the turmoil in the euro area, by end-2011 access 
to market funding became increasingly difficult and 
expensive for the banking sector. Deterioration in funding 
conditions could be observed on both short-term (Chart 2) 
and long-term wholesale markets at end-2011. Senior bank 
bond markets were severely impaired and issuance dropped 
markedly. Meanwhile, external funding of the euro area, 
mainly USD funding, also fell considerably in 2011 H2, not 
only affecting the countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis, 
but Belgium and France as well (Chart 3). The drop in USD 
funding increased reliance on the FX swap market, leading 
to tensions there as well. 
bank lending contracted considerably in the euro area. 
The upswing in private sector lending in the earlier quarters 
came to a halt in 2011 H2. Moreover, compared to Q3, 
household and corporate loans outstanding fell by 3 percent 
on an annualised basis at the end of the year (Chart 4), 
which is partly attributable to the decline in euro area GDP 
and partly to the increase in the liquidity and capital 
tensions in the banking sector. Based on data available until 
February 2012, deleveraging continued with contraction in 
loans outstanding.1
several major central banks decided to take concerted 
steps to ease UsD funding tensions. The maximum 
premium on the central bank US dollar swap facilities 
between the FED and the ECB were reduced by 50 basis 
points, and they committed themselves to maintaining the 
facility until February 2013. Furthermore, until withdrawal, 
the ECB announced one-week and three-month US dollar 
swap tenders and the easing of margin requirements. 
in 2011 Q4, the ecb intensified its government securities 
purchases and introduced secured 3-year loans. In 
addition to the above concerted action, the ECB took 
several measures to mitigate the escalation of the sovereign 
debt crisis and to ease liquidity tensions. These steps 
included the reduction of the policy rate by a total of 50 
basis points, the reserve ratio from 2 percent to 1 percent, 
purchases of government securities, the easing of eligibility 
criteria of collaterals for central bank operations and the 
introduction of 3-year loan tenders. In two rounds, banks 
borrowed a total of EUR 1,000 billion from the ECB within 
the framework of the 3-year LTRO (Long-Term Refinancing 
Operation). Due to the favourable pricing conditions, these 
ECB funds (Chart 5) may improve not only the liquidity 
situation, but also profitability (and thereby the capital 
position as well).
chart 2
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chart 3
non-euro area liabilities of the banking sectors of selected 
countries 
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chart 4
private sector lending in the euro area
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1  A decline in assets can be considered severe if banks tighten non-price credit conditions and, due to deteriorating lending capacity (capital and 
liquidity position) or lower risk appetite, there is a material reduction in the number of creditworthy customers, who otherwise would have demand 
for loans. This increases the risk of the financial accelerator mechanism (the development of a negative spiral, with credit supply constraints and 
economic growth reinforcing one another), which could lead to a credit crunch and to widespread bankruptcy in the corporate sector.
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the 3-year ltRo mitigated the risk of excessive 
deleveraging, but its channelling to the real economy is 
still doubtful. The ample liquidity provided by the ECB’s 
3-year secured lending facility mitigated the risk of excessive 
deleveraging and of a credit crunch, but it is unlikely that 
banks will extend vast amount of long-term loans from 
these funds. One indication of this is found in the latest ECB 
lending survey, as the number of banks tightening credit 
conditions to the private sector was at a high level (Chart 
6) and continued to rise in 2012 Q1 as well. The liquidity 
provided by the LTRO may primarily be used to purchase 
government securities and later for the replacement of still 
expensive market funding. 
the risk of excessive deleveraging still exists in the euro 
area banking sector. First, numerous European banks 
(primarily ones that received state assistance) have not yet 
completed the removal of bad assets from their balance 
sheets. Secondly, due to the rising costs of market funding 
and the new Basel liquidity regulations, banks are reducing 
reliance on wholesale (so-called unstable) funding. Thirdly, 
due to large government deficits and debt in many 
European countries, there is a vast amount of net issuance 
and roll-over needs, which may result in crowding-out 
between governments and banking sectors. Lastly, over the 
short term the strict capital requirements of the EBA and 
Basel 2.5 may result in meaningful balance sheet 
adjustments. 
preparation for the basel iii regulations significantly 
influences the deleveraging of the banking sector. 
Although banks only need to comply with the stricter 
capital requirements from 2015 on, in response to the 
confidence crisis several authorities − including the 
European Banking Authority (EBA), as well as the Slovak, 
Swedish and Austrian authorities − require stricter capital 
requirements sooner. The EBA prescribed a 9 percent core 
tier-1 ratio from the major European banks, which must be 
met by June 2012, resulting in a total EUR 97 billion of 
additional capital need. 
banks are planning moderate deleveraging to meet the 
capital requirements, according to their plans submitted 
to the eba. As regards adjustments on the assets side, a 
decline in risk-weighted assets would account for EUR 16 
billion (Chart 7), whereas asset sales would represent a 
further amount of approximately EUR 85-90 billion; the 
latter, however, does not mean a reduction in the financing 
of the real economy. In addition, a capital need of EUR 16 
billion would be raised from retained earnings in 2012 H1. 
However, the feasibility of the plans is clouded by various 
uncertainties due to the tight deadline and the turbulent 
market environment, which hinders asset sales and the 
chart 5
Monthly average utilisation of the facilities of the ecb and 
its securities purchase programme
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compliance with eba capital requirements
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attainment of profit targets. Consequently, there is a 
significant risk that the higher capital adequacy required by 
the regulatory authority will be attained through stronger 
deleveraging.
empirical analyses of past crises also suggest that further 
deleveraging can be expected in the euro area. In most 
of the past crises, the loan-to-deposit ratio of banking 
sectors declined to 100 percent or below as a result of 
balance sheet adjustment (Chart 8). Consequently, there is 
still room for deleveraging, especially given the 
aforementioned regulatory requirements.
chart 8
loan-to-deposit ratios on the basis of crisis experiences
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1.2.1  RisK peRception of HUngaRy 
is eXtReMely volatile; ReacHing 
an agReeMent witH tHe eU/iMf is 
an URgent necessity
At end-2011, the impact of the escalating sovereign debt 
crisis on the risk perception of Hungary was primarily 
reflected in the HUF exchange rate and Hungarian asset 
prices. In addition to the decline in global risk appetite, 
country-specific factors also contributed to the negative 
sentiment, which culminated in the turbulence experienced 
in early January 2012. In April, the Hungarian 5-year 
sovereign CDS spread reached the same level as in October 
2011. 
Since the last Report, due to global factors alone the risk 
premium would have decreased, but country-specific factors 
led to an increase. These country-specific factors included 
economic policy steps which amplified the uncertainty of 
the investment environment and uncertainties regarding 
the commencement and outcome of the EU/IMF loan 
negotiations. Improvement in the country-specific factor 
requires the earliest possible conclusion of the EU/IMF loan 
negotiations and a rebound in economic growth.
the extreme risk aversion resulting from the escalation of 
the sovereign debt crisis also reached Hungary through 
the risk premium shock channel. Along with the extremely 
volatile global risk appetite, the Hungarian risk premium was 
affected by analysts’ expectations about the timing of an EU/
IMF loan agreement (Box 1). At end-2011, the risk premium 
stemming from economic policy steps that exacerbated 
uncertainty of the investment environment was gradually 
built into asset prices. This was also reflected in the credit 
rating decisions by the end of the year. All the three credit-
rating agencies downgraded Hungary to the non-investment 
grade category. As a result of all this, there was a substantial 
increase in the Hungarian sovereign CDS spread until early 
2012 (Chart 9). Starting from early 2012, the deterioration 
reversed and Hungarian asset prices improved significantly. 
This was attributable to the salient recovery in global risk 
appetite and a more pronounced commitment by the 
government to the EU/IMF loan agreement, which boosted 
investor confidence even before the conclusion of the 
agreement. From March 2012, led by global and country-
1.2  the eU/iMf agreement stabilizes the 
domestic financial markets and the economy
chart 9
Hungarian sovereign cDs spread in regional comparison
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specific factors, risk perception of Hungary started to 
deteriorate again and the 5-year sovereign CDS spread 
reached the same level as in October 2011.
The strong correlation between the CDS spreads of developed and developing countries in past years indicates the existence of common 
risk shocks. The co-movement of spreads takes place at a high frequency (intraday), and in most countries it accounts for more than half 
of the changes in the CDS. In terms of a long-term average, approximately two thirds of the daily changes in the Hungarian 5-year CDS 
spread are related to mainly global and partially regional factors (i.e. developments in other CDS spreads than Hungary are generally in 
line with the changes in the Hungarian CDS), while individual factors account for roughly one third of the variance.3 Individual factors are 
comprised by the effect of country-specific events on risk perception and the measuring error of common effects as well.
By means of factor analysis, the correlations of CDS spreads can be 
classified into global and regional blocks. Then, the time series of 
the common elements of factors can be generated from the global 
and regional blocs. This method may be used for answering two 
important questions. First, the factor structure indicates which 
regions determine the Hungarian CDS spread. Based on changes in 
factor structure, both global and East European regional factors 
determine the Hungarian CDS spread; accordingly, the developed 
euro area and periphery countries showed their effects mainly in 
terms of the global factor. Secondly, the method provides an 
answer to the question of how much the changes in the CDS spread 
are related to country-specific and external factors. This method 
takes into account the sensitivity of the Hungarian spread to 
common shocks, which is different (typically higher) than that of 
other countries. Therefore, it provides a much more precise 
estimate than a simple comparison of the Hungarian CDS spread 
with other regional spreads or an average of spreads. 
The significant increase in the Hungarian CDS spread 
(approximately 300 basis points) during the summer and early 
autumn of 2011 was almost entirely explained by the global factor. Other factors, including the individual (country-specific) component, 
had a minimum impact on the spread in this period.
However, this picture changed as of October 2011. The global risk factor continued to have a significant impact on the Hungarian 
spread, but favourably overall, leading to a decline in the CDS spread. The optimism preceding the October EU summit resulted in a 
decline of 150 basis points. This was before the deteriorating atmosphere, due to the announcement of the referendum in Greece, 
lifted the factor back to the level observed in early October. From December on, however, improving international investor sentiment 
gradually reduced CDS spreads all over the world, resulting in an approximate 150 basis point decline in the Hungarian CDS spread this 
year as well.
Starting from 2011 October, the individual (country-specific) factor had a more significant effect on developments in the Hungarian 
CDS spread. At the same time, this component became considerably more volatile than in previous months. The increase in the 
individual factor in October was attributable to market participants’ risk perception related to the early repayment scheme of 
box 1
Decomposition of the 5-year Hungarian cDs spread
explaining power of certain factors in the Hungarian 
sovereign 5-year cDs spreads 
(six month moving window)
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at the same time, downgrading into the non-investment 
grade category may also have a persistently unfavourable 
effect on the roll-over of Hungary’s external liabilities. In 
parallel with the downgrade of the Hungarian credit rating, 
its foreign currency bond yield grew by a greater extent 
than the 5-year sovereign CDS spread. This difference, 
following some correction, was persistent even after the 
improvement in the global risk appetite in early January. 
Although the divergence between the foreign currency 
bond yield and the CDS spread was observed at a regional 
level as well, it was more pronounced in Hungary; this is 
attributable to the exclusion of euro bonds from eligible 
ECB collaterals (Chart 10). The unfavourable effect of the 
high yield, which is around 8 percent at present, may be 
exacerbated by recent market reaction to the postponement 
of the expected date of an EU/IMF agreement.
similar to the development of sovereign risk indicators, 
global risk shocks also prevailed in the yields of forint 
government securities. Benchmark yields rose gradually 
until the peak of the turbulence observed in the first week 
of January 2012, followed by a decline in yields as a result 
of the favourable external environment and the shift in 
government communication (Chart 11). Due to worsening 
investor sentiment in March, HUF yields are significantly 
higher compared to the mid-October levels. The effect of 
the tense period in December and early January was 
reflected in subdued asset prices as well as in issued 
quantities. In this period, there was a marked drop in 
auction demand, and the debt management agency was 
compelled to cut or cancel primary issuance on several 
occasions. At the same time, following the temporary 
decline until early December, non-residents’ forint-
mortgage loans and then to concerns related to potential 
downgrading of the country. Subsequently, negotiations with the 
Hungarian Banking Association and then the prospect of an EU/
IMF loan reduced the individual factor again. During December, 
downgrades and the sharpening conflict between the government 
and the EU may have added 100 basis points to the Hungarian CDS 
spread again. Then, as a result of more conciliatory government 
communications abroad from January on, the market excluded 
some of the country-specific risks from the pricing. However, 
owing to more pessimistic analyst expectations about the 
postponement and the possible outcome of the EU/IMF talks, the 
country-specific component has deteriorated again since end-
February. Overall, the CDS spread should have improved 
substantially since the 2011 autumn Report on Financial Stability, 
but due to the deterioration in the highly volatile country-specific 
component, the improvement was unable to materialise.
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chart 10
Difference between the euro eMbi global spread and the 
5-year sovereign cDs spread in regional comparison
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chart 11
Reference yields of the Hungarian government securities
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denominated government securities portfolios increased to 
a record HUF 4,200 billion (Chart 12). The ownership 
structure of the non-resident sector continues to be 
concentrated, and it seems that the loss of the investment 
grade category did not generate any critical wave of sales, 
although the ownership structure was somewhat rearranged.
changes in the risk premium during the last half year 
appeared in the development of the eUR/HUf exchange 
rate as well. At the end of the period under review, the 
forint slightly depreciated against the euro compared to 
mid-October, while the Polish zloty − which exhibits an 
empirically similar sensitivity to global shocks − appreciated 
by 2.5 percent versus the euro (Chart 13). The forint’s 
divergent path from the zloty, considered as a benchmark 
currency, was especially striking at the beginning of 
January 2012, when in addition to global and country-
specific factors the change in behaviour of foreign exchange 
market participants contributed also to the extremely weak 
HUF. To mitigate EUR/HUF volatility during period of the 
early repayment scheme, the central bank of Hungary 
launched a new euro tender. In the framework of this new 
instrument, the central bank sold EUR 2.6 billion to the 
domestic banking sector. 
1.2.2  MaRKet liQUiDity followeD 
tHe RisK assessMent of tHe 
coUntRy; MeanwHile, tHe foReign 
eXcHange swap MaRKet is HigHly 
fRagile
The liquidity of markets − apart from the government 
securities market − continues to be below the average of 
the period preceding the autumn 2008 crisis, mainly in 
terms of price indicators. Starting from August 2011, market 
indicators worsened because of global economic and 
financial turbulences. The deterioration culminated at the 
end of the year, when − as a result of seasonal effects and 
the weakening risk perception of Hungary − the aggregate 
liquidity indicator sank to the February 2009 level. In the FX 
swap market, in several maturity segments the difference 
between implied foreign currency yields and reference 
yields of corresponding maturities reached a multi-annual 
peak, in parallel with the increase in sovereign risks. This 
posed a considerable risk to the domestic banking sector, 
which predominantly keeps its open foreign exchange 
position at a stable low level through FX swap transactions. 
Following a strong adjustment in 2012, the liquidity of the 
markets returned to the mid-2011 level. At the same time, 
the events at end-2011 and early 2012 continue to draw 
attention to the vulnerability of liquidity on the key 
markets and, accordingly, to the banking system.
chart 12
non-residents’ government securities holdings and their 
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chart 13
exchange rate changes of regional currencies against the 
euro
(1 September 2011 = 100 percent)
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the liquidity of domestic financial markets has remained 
broadly unchanged during the past half year. In August 
2011, the liquidity indicator started to weaken, in parallel 
with the worsening economic outlook in developed 
economies and escalation of sovereign debt concerns in the 
euro area (Chart 14).4 Then, towards the end of the year, in 
addition to external effects (a series of downgrades and 
gloomy growth prospects of emerging markets), country-
specific factors may also have played a role in the 
deterioration of the liquidity indicator to a low level not 
seen since February 2009. However, with an improvement 
in risk appetite and appreciation of the forint, liquidity 
tensions eased in the first months of 2012, presumably in 
part as a result of steps taken towards co-operation with 
international organisations. The indicator of the unsecured 
overnight interbank and overnight FX swap market remained 
practically unchanged for a year, while deterioration was 
observed in the spot foreign exchange market.
similar to earlier periods, liquidity tensions were observed 
in the HUf/fX swap market in the past half year as well. 
Since the spring of 2011, the on-balance-sheet foreign 
exchange position and net swap exposure of the banking 
sector have increased, leading to increasing tensions in the 
swap market. Spreads widened sharply at end-2011, and by 
the turn of the year they exceeded the 250 basis point level 
for maturities of up to one year (Chart 15).
in January 2012, the domestic fX swap market was 
highly turbulent. Although the tension in the swap market 
due to the closing of positions at the end of 2011 was lower 
than a year earlier, unusual turbulence commenced in the 
second week of January. Worsening risk perception of 
Hungary and the downgrading of the sovereign credit rating 
resulted in tighter counterparty limits on forint assets 
(Chart 16). The tightening of limits of non-resident 
participants on Hungary and limits of domestic banks vis-à-
vis one another drove the supply of forints and the demand 
for foreign exchange to the FX swap markets, where 
transactions are considered to be secured. The increased 
foreign exchange demand on the 3-month segment resulted 
in a nearly 2 percentage point increase in the implied yield 
spread. Forint assets flowing to the swap market, which 
was enhanced by the closing of short forint positions and 
the building up of long positions, resulted in a further 
increase in forint liquidity.
in order to ease market tensions, the Mnb provided 
foreign exchange liquidity for the banking sector via its 
fX swap facilities. In early September 2011, the outstanding 
amount of the MNB’s euro liquidity providing 3-month EUR/
chart 14
aggregate market liquidity index and its sub-indices 
(exponential moving averages)
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chart 15
o/n, 3-month, 6-month and 1-year forint fX-swap spreads 
(exponential moving averages)
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chart 16
flow chart of fX swap and deposit market tensions as at 
mid-January 2012
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4  For more details on the aggregate liquidity indicator see: JuDit Páles anD lóránt VarGa: Trends in the liquidity of Hungarian financial markets – What 
does the MNB’s new liquidity index show?. MNB Bulletin, April 2008.
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HUF FX swap facility increased to a local peak (Chart 17). In 
turn, during the tensions of January 2012, the outstanding 
amount reached an all-time high of EUR 2,055 million, 
followed by a gradual decline since then. In order to 
prevent a recurrence of the previous year’s turbulence, the 
MNB announced a one-off euro liquidity providing operation 
against forint collateral for one-week maturity as well at 
end-December 2011. 
the liquidity of the eUR/HUf spot foreign exchange 
market showed strong co-movement with changes in the 
exchange rate. In the autumn of 2011, exchange rate 
depreciation was accompanied by deteriorating liquidity on 
the market, which was primarily reflected in an increase in 
the bid-ask spread (Chart 18). In parallel, non-residents 
built up a significant synthetic forward position against the 
forint by means of spot and FX swap transactions. Later, in 
early January 2012, as a correction took place in the 
exchange rate, the bid-ask spread also started to narrow. It 
could be observed that in non-residents’ speculation, the 
trend reversal (i.e. the considerable reduction of positions 
against the forint) already took place at the beginning of 
December 2011 (i.e. earlier than that of the exchange rate).
the improvement in the liquidity of forint-denominated 
government bonds came to a halt by the autumn. In 2011, 
non-residents’ share in both the outstanding amount and the 
turnover of total government securities increased, compared 
to previous years. While non-residents had accounted for 
20-40 percent of the turnover in previous years, their share 
reached 40-70 percent in 2011 (Chart 19). Accordingly, non-
residents’ activity contributed to the improvement in the 
liquidity of the government securities market. In addition, 
the spread between the government securities yield and the 
interest rate swap yield also had a rather low range in H1, 
an indication of the favourable liquidity position of the 
government securities market. Starting from the autumn of 
2011, with a general deterioration in liquidity, the interest 
rate swap spread surged. At the same time, non-residents’ 
share in the turnover declined. Accordingly, at the end of 
the year, similar to the FX swap market, deterioration in 
liquidity was caused by the bid-ask spread and price impact 
indicators as well. In early 2012, however, signs of 
consolidation were seen here as well.  
1.2.3  UnfavoURable econoMic 
gRowtH pRospects, slowly 
Declining eXteRnal Debt 
inDicatoRs
The Hungarian economy is likely to stagnate in 2012, with 
growth expected to resume in 2013. Domestic demand 
continues to be low, and growth is driven by exports. In 
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chart 18
forint/euro exchange rate and the bid-ask spread index of 
the spot forint/euro foreign exchange market
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share of non-residents in the government bond market 
turnover and the 5-year interest rate swap spread
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keeping with the decline in household income, consumption 
is expected to remain subdued. The uncertain outlook for 
growth may lead to weak investment activity. Labour 
market conditions are expected to remain slack, as the 
increase in activity is coupled with restrained demand for 
labour.
The net external debt of Hungary, a key vulnerability of the 
country, will continue to decline but remain high. The 
reduction of vulnerability requires a change of model in the 
funding of the state and the banking system, which means 
greater reliance on domestic savings and lower reliance on 
external funding. In the current uncertain external 
environment, the risk is high that funding conditions of the 
Hungarian state and the banking sector will be hit by a 
strong negative shock. At the same time, the EU/IMF 
agreement may work as a safety net, resulting in markedly 
lower sensitivity to risk premium shocks and lower external 
funding costs; hence, the agreement may facilitate a 
managed shift to the new funding model.
slackening growth is expected over the short term. Our 
latest forecast points to a slowdown of the Hungarian 
economy. Although the growth data at the end of last year 
was better than expected (Chart 20), it is largely attributable 
to the one-off performance of the agricultural and 
construction sectors (the latter being due to infrastructure 
investments by the state). With the end of these impacts, 
growth is expected to decline this year (Chart 21). Household 
labour income in real terms and direct fiscal transfers will 
decrease this year; therefore, household consumption 
expenditures are expected to fall in 2012 and to increase 
only slightly next year. The uncertain growth outlook and 
tight credit conditions may restrain corporate investment. 
Aside from the effect of some large projects, investment 
will only consist of amortisation replacement. The 
deteriorating profitability of firms also suggests low 
investment activity. In addition to subdued domestic 
demand − due to unfavourable global growth prospects − 
export dynamics are also expected to slow down. The 
output gap may continue to widen in 2012 and remain 
negative, in spite of its gradual closing from next year on.
labour market conditions will remain slack over the next 
two years. As a result of government measures aimed at 
increasing the activity rate, the previous expansion of 
labour supply may continue over the forecast horizon. 
However, employment will continue to be determined by 
the weak growth outlook; therefore, employment may 
decline over the short term, and no major increase in the 
number of employed is expected in the private sector in the 
coming two years. In line with that, unemployment may 
continue to rise (Chart 22).
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chart 22
changes in major labour market indicators
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Households’ disposable income may markedly decline in 
2012. Household income positions will weaken in the first 
half of the forecast period, while a slight increase is 
expected in 2013 (Chart 23). Although for those with low 
incomes the increase in the minimum wage and wage 
compensation keep net nominal wages at an unchanged 
level, the purchasing power of their income is declining as 
a result of higher–than-expected inflation. Moreover, 
government measures focused on meeting the fiscal deficit 
target also reduce households’ direct fiscal transfers.
the savings rate may remain above its pre-crisis level. 
The early final repayment of foreign exchange loans 
resulted in a significant improvement in the wealth of the 
households that participated in the scheme, but its 
beneficial impact is likely to take longer to be reflected in 
terms of consumption. Over the short term, however, due 
to the uncertain economic environment, decisions about 
consumption may continue to be characterised by strong 
precautionary considerations. Consequently, the savings 
rate may remain above its pre-crisis level. 
the external financing capacity of the economy continued 
to increase slightly in 2011. The developments in savings 
in individual sectors were determined by general government 
easing. Compared to the significant increase in the financing 
requirement of the government − excluding pension funds 
− to 7 percent of GDP, the net financial savings of 
corporations and households increased considerably. In the 
case of the corporate sector, still weak investment and the 
accounting of the VAT refund awarded by the European 
Court continue to be the main underlying reasons for higher 
savings. In the case of the household sector, financial 
savings were augmented by tax amendments favourable for 
households with higher income and lower consumption, the 
disbursement of pension funds’ real yields and the 
considerable decrease in loans outstanding as a result of 
the early repayment scheme. In addition, the EU transfers 
that increased significantly at end-2011 also resulted in a 
further improvement in the net financial position of 
domestic participants (Chart 24). 
on the financing side, the increase in the net financial 
savings of the private sector was primarily related to the 
increase in bank loan repayment. The main underlying 
reason for the conversion of the net financing capacity of 
the private sector into net savings following the crisis was 
the decline in borrowing from banks. In 2011, the early 
repayment scheme, which reduced households’ outstanding 
debt by nearly 2 percent of GDP, contributed considerably 
to the increase in loan repayments and thus to the net 
financing capacity as well. In the corporate sector, 
significant amounts of both bank loans and intercompany 
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loans from parents were repaid. At the same time, it is 
important to complete the picture of external funds of 
corporations with the fact that no decline in equity-type 
liabilities was experienced; this may be explained by the 
fact that, within groups of companies, the passage between 
loan-type and equity-type financing is very frequent. 
external financing capacity, which is expected to 
continue to increase, makes further withdrawal of funds 
likely. A further decline in domestic demand and an 
improvement in terms of trade may add to the surplus of 
the goods and services balance in coming years as well. 
Moreover, an acceleration in external economic activity, as 
well as the increasing export performance of the automotive 
industry, may also contribute to this in 2013. Meanwhile, in 
parallel with higher interest expenditures and a considerable 
increase in the profit of foreign-owned companies in 2013, 
the deficit of the income balance may grow. However, it is 
expected to be more than offset by the balance improving 
effect of the increase in EU transfers. Overall, the net 
savings position of Hungary may continue to increase in 
coming years, and the external financing capacity “from 
below” (that is important from a financing aspect) may 
reach 5.7 percent of GDP by 2013 (Table 1). However, these 
developments also mean that the outflow of debt-type 
liabilities from the economy may continue to an increasing 
extent. Considering the reliance of the government 
securities market on foreign participants, this may 
materialise in an increasing withdrawal of funds by foreign 
banks.
in spite of permanently favourable flow data, there was 
no decline in debt indicators; however, a significant 
decrease is expected in the future. The external financing 
capacity entailed a net decline in debt-type liabilities 
(Chart 25); within that, external funds of banks decreased 
considerably. However, external debt ratios as a proportion 
of GDP, which are important in terms of external 
table 1
external financing capacity as a proportion of gDp
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
fact/preliminary fact forecast
i. current account (1+2+3) −7.3 −7.3 −0.2 1.2 1.4 3.1 3.7
  1. Balance of wares and services 0.7 0.3 4.7 6.3 7.2 8.6 9.9
  2. Balance of income −7.4 −7.1 −5.3 −5.5 −6.3 −6.3 −7.1
  3. Balance of unrequited transactions −0.5 −0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9
ii. capital account 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.8 2.1 2.6 3.2
iii. net errors and omissions 0.0 −2.2 −0.4 −1.7 −1.8 −1.3 −1.2
external financing ability “from above” (i+ii) −6.6 −6.4 1.0 3.0 3.6 5.7 7.0
external financing ability “from below” (i+ii+iii) −6.6 −8.5 0.6 1.3 1.7 4.4 5.7
Source: MNB.
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vulnerability, continue to exceed the levels that were 
typical prior to the crisis. Namely, the decline in outstanding 
debt was significantly slowed by the depreciation of the 
forint and the increase of the risk premium on Hungarian 
assets. However, assuming a stable exchange rate, the high 
external financing capacity of the economy may result in a 
significant decrease in the external debt rate in the coming 
years (Chart 26).
steep contraction in net external debt should be 
circumvented. Looking forward, it is favourable that the 
net external debt may shrink. The pace of the transition 
from external funds to higher reliance on domestic savings 
is critical for both the banking sector and the state. 
Supposing, for instance, that the outflow is faster than the 
expansion of domestic savings, then banks may be forced 
into stronger deleveraging, leading to growth sacrifices 
(stronger pro-cyclicality), which in turn may spiral back into 
concerns about debt sustainability. In the present uncertain 
external environment, there is a high risk that the banking 
sector will be hit by a negative shock, which could facilitate 
increasing withdrawal of funds by foreign banks. The EU/
IMF agreement may first provide a coordinated decrease in 
net external debt, not hindering the economic growth in 
the coming years. (Chart 27). 
crowding-out may emerge between the state and banking 
sector. The shift in the funding model of banking sector is 
hindered not only by the uncertain global environment, but 
also by the crowding-out effect of the state. Banks have to 
compete for domestic savings not only with one another, 
but also with the state. This may be especially crucial, 
because both the state and the banking sector will have 
significant roll-over needs in the coming years (Chart 28). 
The EU/IMF agreement may alleviate this crowding-out 
effect. 
1.2.4  weaK econoMic activity in 
tHe ResiDential HoUsing MaRKet, 
wHicH can gRaDUally ReacH a 
tRoUgH oveR tHe coURse of tHe 
neXt yeaR
Economic activity in the housing market was restrained in 
2011 as well. While the number of housing market 
transactions stagnated, housing prices continued to decline, 
albeit at a slower pace. The number of newly built homes 
reached a historic low during the year. At the same time, 
stagnation in the number of building permits foreshadows 
consolidation on the market. The utilisation rate of quotas 
on foreclosure is high; utilisation exceeded 85 percent 
during the past two quarters.
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Housing market turnover stagnated during 2011; the real 
estate market may gradually reach the bottom this year. 
Similar to 2009 and 2010, the housing market was 
characterised by restrained activity in 2011. The estimated 
number of housing market transactions is 92,000 (Chart 29), 
which corresponds to the magnitude of the previous two 
years. The distribution of the transactions during the year 
was uneven; there was some upswing in turnover in the last 
months of 2011, which may be related to the early 
repayment scheme at the favourable exchange rate of 
mortgage loans.
the weak housing market may be explained by both 
demand and supply factors. From the demand side, the 
pick-up in the housing market was hindered by households’ 
high indebtedness, unfavourable income and employment 
situations, and strict credit conditions. On the supply side, 
the number of newly built homes plummeted to a historic 
low. The number of building permits, which is a good 
predictor of the number of new homes, also dropped (Chart 
30). The 68 percent decline in the number of building 
permits since 2007 is one of the most severe drops in 
Europe, significantly exceeding the average 44 percent 
decline observed in the European Union (Chart 31). At the 
same time, it may be a favourable sign that the number of 
building permits started to stagnate in the second half of 
the year, signalling a consolidation of the market of newly 
built homes.
in 2011, the decline in housing prices that began in 2008 
slowed down. Housing prices fell by an average 1.9 percent 
during 2011, making a total drop of 15 percent since the 
peak in 2008. However, trends in housing prices over the 
course of the year diverged somewhat from expectations, 
as the decline in housing prices as a result of the early 
repayment scheme has not yet occurred. Moreover, 
according to the housing price index of the FHB Land Credit 
and Mortgage Bank Company, housing prices rose slightly in 
the last quarter of 2011. Nevertheless, it should not be 
ruled out that adjustments may take place in 2012 Q1, 
leading to a further drop in prices.
the government’s Home creation programme adopted in 
December 2011 may only result in a moderate increase 
in activity in the housing market. With sustainable fiscal 
burdens, the objective of the programme is to stop the 
trend of decline in the construction of new homes and to 
stimulate the housing market. One of the pillars of the 
programme is the home-building subsidy,5 which supports 
the construction and purchase of new homes. The other 
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5 Government Decree 256/2011 (XII. 6.) on the home-building subsidy.
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element of the programme is the home-creation interest 
rate subsidy,6 which supports both the building and 
purchasing of new homes and the purchasing and renewal 
of used dwellings.
the number of homes serving as collateral for delinquent 
loans rose further in 2011. The number of residential 
properties securing loans overdue more than 90 days rose 
by around 30,000 to 119,000 in 2011. The gravity of the 
problem is clearly reflected in the fact that this exceeds 
2011 turnover in the residential market by approximately 30 
percent (Chart 32).
following the lifting of the moratorium on auctions, a 
quota scheme on foreclosures was introduced. The aim of 
the quota was to avoid uncoordinated portfolio cleaning and 
its detrimental impact on the residential property market. 
The quota regime established a limit for the number of 
residential properties that can be auctioned. In 2011 Q4, 
the limit was 2 percent of the homes serving as collateral. 
Corresponding figures for 2012, 2013 and 2014 are 3, 4 and 
5 percent, respectively. The quota scheme applies to 
residential properties previously not earmarked for forced 
sales and serving as collateral for mortgage loans at least 
90 days past due, irrespective of their market value. At the 
level of the banking system, the quota for distressed sales 
covered approximately 90,000 residential properties in 2011 
Q4 and 2012 Q1 (Table 2). The utilisation rate of the quota 
was 87 and 94 percent, respectively, which is considerable 
high, while number of actors with significant market share 
had a 100 percent quota utilisation rate. The utilization rate 
itself does not provide evidence of the extent to which 
quotas impeded portfolio cleaning, since earmarking for 
sale does not mean automatic foreclosing. At this time data 
on foreclosing procedures are not available.
table 2
Utilisation rate of the quota scheme 
2011 Q4 2012 Q1
Retail properties serving as a basis of the quota 89,753 90,083
Number of retail properties that can be designated according to the 
quota 1,942 2,854
Number of retail properties designated for forced liquidation 1,690 2,681
Utilisation of the quota (%) 87 94
Note: Data refers to the banking sector and branches. 
Source: MNB.
6 Government Decree 341/2011 (XII. 29.) on the home-creation interest rate subsidy.
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2.1.1  eXcessive oUtflow of 
eXteRnal fUnDs May fURtHeR 
weaKen coRpoRate lenDing
contraction in corporate loans outstanding continues. 
Corporate loans outstanding of the domestic financial 
intermediaries continued to contract in 2011 (Chart 33). In 
net terms adjusted by exchange rate, domestic corporate 
loans outstanding shrank by a total of HUF 570 billion, 
representing an annual decline of 6.6 percent. During 2011, 
2  stability of the Hungarian financial 
system
2.1  Risk of a significant credit contraction is 
increasing in the corporate segment, whereas 
focus in the household segment is on the 
management of loans outstanding
In 2011, lending activity continued to decline in the corporate and household segments. On the supply side, the weakening 
of the banking sector’s lending capacity became more pronounced. The outflow of external liabilities from the banking 
sector may become the reason for − rather than the consequence of − a contraction in lending. Due to a lower willingness 
to take risks and the substantial outflows of external liabilities, companies are facing tighter credit conditions. Although 
demand for credit is also decreasing as a result of deteriorating economic prospects and the subsequent downturn in 
investment, investments are being postponed or cancelled owing to credit supply constraints. Therefore, a turnaround in 
corporate lending cannot be expected, due to tight credit conditions, until after 2013.
One of the important driving forces of lending to households was the early repayment scheme for foreign currency loans 
at a preferential exchange rate at end-2011, which resulted in a nearly one-quarter decline in foreign currency mortgage 
loans outstanding. Both price and non-price conditions of banks became stricter in the household segment during 2011. 
However, this was mostly a consequence of the effect of the early repayments. Following this scheme of the exchange rate 
cap and the handling of non-performing household loans (i.e. the solving of problems related to loans outstanding), banks 
may focus on increasing forint-denominated mortgage lending within new lending. However, new lending will fall below 
the level of principal repayments of households over the forecast horizon, and thus an increase in loans outstanding should 
be expected only after 2013.
The current lending forecasts are accompanied by significant risks, both in the positive and negative directions. The 
intensified interventions of the ECB and the MNB represent an upside. These steps may have positive pass-through effects, 
which may materialise in a permanent easing of European funding difficulties and a turnaround in business activity. 
However, a permanent deterioration in the external environment, excessive deleveraging of the euro area banking sector 
and a disadvantageous regional allocation of funds may result in a tighter credit supply of domestic financial intermediaries, 
pointing to a credit crunch. In this case, in parallel with the withdrawal of external funds, a faster contraction in corporate 
lending may take place.
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the decline in long-term loans dominated on the whole, 
while short-term loans decreased only to a lesser extent, 
mainly as a result of some increase offsets in the third 
quarter. In a breakdown by currencies, the outstanding 
amount of both forint and foreign exchange denominated 
loans shrank, the latter to a greater extent. The decline in 
long-term (foreign currency) loans is not surprising: with 
the worsening global and domestic economic outlook, 
corporate investment activity remained modest, and thus 
long-term borrowing is still not essential. 
the declining domestic corporate lending is not replaced 
by external financing. An alternative to lending by 
domestic financial intermediaries is cross-border lending, 
which could partially satisfy corporate demand for funding. 
Although developments in external financing show high 
volatility, 2011 was the first year in the period since the 
crisis when in terms of an annual aggregate neither 
intragroup nor other external financing was able to grow 
(Chart 34).
the decline in lending by banks to corporations is 
stronger in Hungary than in the region. In the corporate 
segment, developments in lending in Hungary continue to 
diverge from the region: with the exception of Hungary, 
corporate lending expanded in all countries in the CEE 
region during 2011, whereas a substantial decline was 
recorded in Hungary (Chart 35). However, at the end of the 
year the growth of corporate loans came to a sudden stop 
or the decline accelerated in almost all countries of the 
region. Except for in the Czech Republic and Poland, 
corporate lending in all regional countries remained steady 
or continued to decline in the first months of 2012, a 
potential sign of worsening economic outlook in the region 
and the euro area as well.
credit supply constraints can increasingly be attributed 
to deterioration in lending capacity. Previously, demand 
constraints may have played a smaller role than supply 
constraints in the decline of lending for the corporate 
segment.7 Supply constraints were mainly explained by a 
low willingness to lend. More recently, due to a decline in 
their risk tolerance, banks typically intended to only 
finance more creditworthy companies. However, according 
to the findings of the latest Senior Loan Officer Survey on 
Bank Lending Practices, in the case of some banks a 
deterioration in the capital position and especially the 
liquidity position already played a significant role in the 
factors that contributed to tightening (Chart 36). Lending 
capacity is impaired on the capital side due to rising loan 
losses and early repayments, whereas on the funding side it 
chart 33
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is impaired by rising funding costs and the withdrawal of 
external funds. The last time that such a proportion of 
banks reported deterioration in funding conditions was at 
the outbreak of the September 2008 crisis. The deteriorating 
ability to lend may considerably extend the period of 
creditless recovery, although it cannot yet be considered a 
credit crunch (Box 2).
8  Fábián, GerGely, anDrás HuDecZ anD Gábor sZiGel (2010), ‘Decline in Corporate Lending in Hungary and across the Central and East European region during 
the crisis’, MNB Bulletin, October, pp. 17−28.
9  tamási, bálint anD baláZs ViláGi (2011), ‘Identification of credit supply shocks in a Bayesian SvAR model of the Hungarian Economy’, MNB Working 
Papers, 7.
Since eruption of the crisis in 2008, there has been a considerable 
decline in loans outstanding in a regional comparison as well. 
According to our forecast, no material increase in lending is 
expected in the corporate segment until end-2013. Accordingly, a 
creditless recovery will be seen in Hungary (i.e. the increase in 
output) will not be coupled with an upturn in lending in the post-
crisis period. Several analyses prepared by the MNB (Fábián et al., 
2010;8 Sóvágó, 2011) have also pointed out that the decline in 
credit supply played a major role in contraction in corporate loans 
outstanding, whereas the study by Tamási and világi (2011)9 
identified significant growth sacrifice from credit supply shocks, 
based on domestic data. The Senior Loan Officer Surveys suggest 
that the restrained credit supply can mainly be explained by 
unfavourable economic prospects, low risk tolerance and, to a 
lesser extent, the capital and liquidity position of banks. However, 
it is also important to emphasise that both the creditworthiness 
and credit demand of companies declined markedly compared to 
the pre-crisis period. 
In terms of an assessment of the effects of constrained credit supply on the real economy, two extremely different cases need to be 
distinguished. In the first and less serious case, investments are only sufficient for sustaining the level of production capacities. In the 
second and more drastic case, credit supply constraints result in decaying capital stock. In both cases, the tight credit supply damages 
potential output; in the first case, this is due to the postponement of investment itself, while in the latter case it is also due to the 
box 2
is there a credit crunch in the Hungarian corporate loan market?
new disbursements to non-financial corporates 
(excluding overdrafts)
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loss of production capacities because of viable enterprises going 
bankrupt. Although there is a qualitative difference between 
these two cases, unfortunately they cannot be clearly separated 
from one another. By presenting the structure of lending and 
analysing the relationship between lending and sector bankruptcy 
and default rates, below we attempt to examine whether a milder 
or more drastic stage of credit contraction (i.e. a credit crunch) 
can be observed.
Recently, the dynamics of corporate loans outstanding were 
determined by the change in the relation between loan issues and 
loan maturities. Examining new loans, it can be concluded that 
since 2008 the average volume of new corporate loans has declined 
year after year. This is true for both the overall number and the 
average amount of loans granted; since the onset of the crisis, 
fewer and smaller loans have been extended in the corporate 
segment. The reduction in the original maturity of new loans also 
contributes to the decline in loans outstanding: compared to 
contractual maturities in 2007 and 2008, the maturities of loans 
extended by banks in 2011 were 20 percent shorter on average. 
However, this picture is refined by the fact that the gross issue of 
overdrafts has been increasing since mid-2010, and the magnitude 
of the volume is similar to pre-crisis levels.
The breakdown of loans outstanding by maturities reveals 
differences between individual types of loans. Following the 
outbreak of the crisis, in parallel with the economic downturn, 
short-term loans outstanding declined considerably before 
becoming stable in June 2010; since then, no major change has 
taken place in short-term loans outstanding. The stabilisation of 
short-term, typically working capital financing loans indicates that 
credit supply constraints have not made the operation of viable 
companies impossible and have not resulted in a loss of capacities. 
By contrast, long-term loans (with a maturity of over one year) have 
declined steadily since the outbreak of the crisis. Following the 
concentration of maturities, they are declining more slowly, but in 
a more protracted way. However, the decline in long-term loans suggests that important investments in terms of economic growth have 
failed to materialise, resulting in a decline in potential output already in the medium term. Even alternative ways of financing have been 
unable to compensate for the gap in corporate lending since end-2008: borrowing from abroad and trade credit have both remained low, 
in parallel with the decline in domestic lending.
The constraining of the credit supply is inseparable from an increase in risks and, therefore, from developments in the riskiness of 
individual companies and the frequency of credit defaults. According to the data of the Central Credit Information System (CCIS), in 
the period since the crisis, in parallel with an increase in defaults, a considerable decline in the number of new loans is observed (i.e. 
as their risks increased, banks may have permanently reduced their lending). However, the correlation between lending and defaults 
is different across sectors. In parallel with the increase in defaults, the number of new loan agreements declined particularly in 
manufacturing and construction, as well as the trading, transportation and catering sectors. With the exception of the trading sector, 
these are the ones where the average maturity of new loans also declined considerably.
However, the picture is rendered more subtle by the fact that in aggregate terms, corporate deposits did not show any significant 
decline. On the contrary, their level in 2011 exceeded the end-September 2008 figure by approximately 15 percent. However, in 
corporate loans of the banking sector
(September 2008 = 100 percent)
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in the majority of sectors, neither production nor 
lending reached pre-crisis levels. Although in terms of 
economic growth both 2010 and 2011 were characterised by 
slow recovery, in aggregate terms the production of the 
sectors of the domestic economy is still 4 percent below the 
2008 pre-crisis levels (Chart 37). At the same time, 
compared to the same year, corporate lending declined 
steadily by a total of nearly 18 percent. However, some 
sectors show significant heterogeneity. Of the main sectors, 
both output and lending in construction and trade fell 
substantially compared to their 2008 levels, whereas the 
output of the services sector was around the national 
economy’s average and its borrowing was above it. However, 
manufacturing differed from the other sectors. 
contrast to the aggregate picture, there may be significant asymmetry between individual sectors. Moreover, in some sectors a 
reduction of lending may cause a further increase in credit defaults and corporate bankruptcies.
At a sector level, we used the Granger causality test10 to examine whether developments in lending facilitate forecasting of the 
bankruptcy rate. The analysis covered the period between 2002 and 2011, examining quarterly data using a three-variable vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model, which included the sector production volume index, in addition to the bankruptcy rate and loans 
outstanding of the sector. It was found that a Granger causal relation between loans outstanding and bankruptcy rate can only be 
detected in the real estate transactions sector. The picture is similar if only short-term loans are examined, instead of total loans 
outstanding. The findings suggest that outstanding loans facilitate forecasting of the bankruptcy rate in the trading, repair, 
accommodation services and catering sectors, as well as the real estate transactions sector. Although this simple analysis allows only 
very limited conclusions to be drawn, with the exception of the real estate transactions sector the findings do not confirm that a tighter 
credit supply results in an increase in the corporate bankruptcy rate.
Based on the findings presented here, credit supply tightened considerably after the crisis, which resulted in growth sacrifices. The 
decline in credit supply is partly a cyclical phenomenon, but on the basis of the decline in long-term loans it cannot be excluded that 
the fall in credit supply also reduced potential growth through unrealised investment. This suggests the presence of tight credit supply 
constraints. At the same time, the situation is not so serious (i.e. strict credit conditions have not caused a mass bankruptcy of viable 
enterprises or a loss of capacities), and there is no sign of a credit crunch. However, it is important to emphasise that foreign currency 
funding tensions have been increasingly contributing to the tightening of credit supply in recent months If this situation was permanent, 
that could raise the risk of the evolution of a credit crunch.
granger causality test for the credit stock and the bankruptcy rate on the sector level
agriculture Manufacturing construction
trade and 
accomodation
Real estate 
acitivities*
Total loans − − − −  +
Short-term loans − − −  +  +
* Real estate activities sector contains the majority of the project loans.
Note: +: The null hypothesis that the credit variable is not the Granger cause of the bankruptcy rate can be discarded at a significance level 
of 5%; 
−: The null hypothesis that the credit variable is not the Granger cause of the bankruptcy rate cannot be discarded at a significance level of 5%.
Source: MNB.
10  For more details on the method see: toDa, Hiro y. anD yamamoto, taKu (1995), Statistical inference in vector autoregressions with possibly integrated 
processes, Journal of Econometrics, volume 66, Issues 1-2, pp. 225−250.
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Relative changes in the production of and lending to 
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weak borrowing despite the expansion of manufacturing 
production reflects the postponement of investment. 
Although the production of manufacturing companies, 
which represent a significant weight within the export 
sector, has grown since end-2009, no similar turnaround is 
recorded in the borrowing by the sector for long-term loans 
in particular. Despite the increase in production (apart from 
some individual large projects with intragroup financing), 
the sector continues to be characterised by postponements 
of investment decisions; therefore, its related lending 
activity is also subdued (Chart 38).
2.1.2  banKs aRe focUsing on 
Managing tHeiR HoUseHolD loans 
oUtstanDing RatHeR tHan on 
incReasing new lenDing
at the end of the year, deleveraging of households was 
accelerated by the early repayment scheme for foreign 
currency loans. Households deleveraging continued in 
2011, although this decelerated considerably due to the 
strengthening of the Swiss franc during the year. For the 
year as a whole, foreign exchange loans declined, while 
forint lending increased slightly. In 2011 Q4, the 
preferential early repayments of foreign currency 
mortgage loans accelerated the decline in loans 
outstanding (Box 3). By end-2011, households paid back 
foreign exchange loans amounting to HUF 650 billion, for 
which they used refinancing loans amounting to a total of 
HUF 89 billion (Chart 39). As a result, with exchange rate 
adjustment, the amount of household loans outstanding 
declined by HUF 1,065 billion (i.e. 10.6 percent among 
domestic financial intermediaries during 2011, although 
the rate of decline would have been 5.7 percent without 
the early repayments).
chart 38
changes in the production of and lending to manufacturing 
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chart 39
net quarterly changes in household loans broken down by 
products
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In order to reduce the vulnerability stemming from the high foreign exchange exposure of households, the government made early 
repayment at a preferential fixed exchange rate possible for foreign currency denominated mortgage loan debtors. The central bank 
expected 20 percent participation as a proportion of all outstanding foreign currency denominated mortgage loans in advance. In 
connection with the financing of the early repayment, we assumed that around 75 percent of clients would borrow the funds required 
for early repayment, while the remaining 25 percent would use their savings. By the closing of the early repayment programme at 
end-February 2012, households had repaid foreign currency denominated loans amounting − at market value − to approximately HUF 
1,350 billion. Corresponding to a higher-than-expected participation of 24.1 percent as a proportion of total outstanding loans, this 
meant the termination of nearly 170,000 loan agreements. In line with our expectations, Swiss franc debtors (with 96 percent of the 
repaid loans) accounted for the highest proportion of those who seized the opportunity of early repayment. At the same time, 
households only used HUF 980 billion, corresponding to the value calculated at the fixed exchange rate; the difference between the 
box 3
participation and funding sources in the early repayment scheme at preferential exchange rate
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amount of loans calculated at the current and preferential 
exchange rates is recorded as the increment of household net 
financial assets and banks’ loss. 
According to the data of the HFSA, the amount of refinancing 
loans extended for the purpose of early repayment was around 
HUF 310 billion. Accordingly, households financed two thirds of 
early repayment from their financial savings. It is especially 
difficult to assess the impact of the early repayment on financial 
assets, however, as the sources of early repayment cannot 
expressly be linked to the changes in individual financial assets. 
Before drawing conclusions, we attempted to exclude from the 
data available to us seasonal effects, rearrangements among 
assets and individual factors.
Available data suggest that early repayment was mainly financed 
from bank deposits and securities, including investment fund 
units in particular. In the early repayment period, these were the assets where a considerable decline was observed compared to the 
same period of the previous year. Consequently, households may have mostly used these assets as a source of funding for early 
repayment. However, it is difficult to obtain a clear picture, given that complete data for all financial assets, household income 
development and consumption behaviour at the beginning of the year are not yet available.
Further information about other sources of early repayment is provided by the 2011 Q4 financial account. Based on the data, in the 
last quarter of 2011 the redeeming of life insurance and capital outflows from voluntary pension funds also contributed to the funding 
of early repayment. However, these funds presumably did not exceed HUF 50 billion.
Overall, most of the early repayment was likely funded from domestic, observed financial assets. However, it cannot be ruled out that 
funds not observed by statistics were used by households for early repayment. For example, they may have used loans from employers 
or assets held abroad.
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Disregarding the impact of the early repayment, 
household credit demand continues to be weak. Although 
early repayments accounted for a significant portion of the 
decline in loans, borrowing by households otherwise 
remains subdued. The depreciation of the forint against the 
Swiss franc puts significant pressure on households’ 
deleveraging (Chart 40), as well as their disposable income. 
Apart from some one-off effects (e.g. real yield 
disbursements from private pension funds, bonus payments 
at the end of the year), household consumption remained 
subdued throughout the year. New borrowing, including 
refinancing loans, was the lowest in 2011 since the outset 
of the crisis: 9 percent less than in 2010 and 28 percent less 
than in 2009 (Chart 41). Nevertheless, a rapid upturn cannot 
be expected following the early repayments. First, the 
disposable income of households with foreign exchange 
loans continues to be burdened by the strong Swiss franc 
(the exchange rate cap scheme may help this group). 
Secondly, in the case of households that used the opportunity 
of early repayment, they are expected to rebuild their 
depleted savings rather than increase consumption or new 
borrowing.
in addition to demand constraints, supply constraints are 
also becoming increasingly pronounced. 2011 was 
characterised by a tightening of the conditions of lending to 
households. Interest rates on both housing and home equity 
loans increased, compared to December 2010 (Chart 42). 
The increase in APRC was partly attributable to the rise in 
the central bank base rate, but spreads above the interbank 
rate also increased by 1-1.3 percentage points. Based on the 
tightening of price and non-price conditions, banks are 
focusing on less risky, premium clients. This tightening 
cannot be separated from other additional risks that arise 
as a result of early repayments and affect loans outstanding. 
Over the short term, an attempt to reduce these risks is 
expected in the banking sector (including the application of 
the exchange rate fixation and the management of non-
performing loans). Only following that will the banking 
financing sources in the early repayment scheme
source of repayment of outstanding credit HUf bn
Loan refinancing (new borrowing, fact) 310
Bank deposits and securities (estimate) 600
Redemption of life insurance, withdrawal of voluntary pension fund yield (estimate) 50
Other 20
total 980
Source: MNB.
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sector focus on new disbursements and, within that, mainly 
forint-denominated mortgage loans. In the medium term, 
interest rate spreads on new loans are expected to 
decrease, partly due to expected stronger competition in 
the household segment and partly due to the extension of 
the complete credit registry to households (Box 4).
chart 42
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In the household segment, risk-based pricing in Hungary was seriously constrained by the fact that, until recently for households only 
negative (i.e. credit default) data were collected. The MNB and the HFSA had advocated the institution of a complete credit registry 
system for a long time, and with the inclusion of the MNB’s proposals regarding transparent pricing in provisions of law, the creation 
of a database like this became even more important for the purposes of adequate risk assessment and accounting for risks in pricing. 
Finally, within the framework of the Country Protection Action Plan, the Central Credit Information System Act (CCIS Act) was adopted 
in September 2011. Pursuant to this Act, a complete credit registry system was set up in both the corporate and the household 
segments. The scope of the credit data kept on file pursuant to the new CCIS Act has significantly been extended compared to the 
earlier system (new data are highlighted in red in the chart). 
In the case of negative data, debts are included in the CCIS after 30-day past overdue for companies and after 90-day past overdue for 
retail customers. Positive data are automatically included in the system for both corporate and retail customers, although an important 
difference exists: upon applying for loans, retail customers may prohibit the retrieval of data in a statement. In practise, this means 
that in the future a financial institution will only have access to a borrower’s positive data if the customer has permitted it in an earlier 
statement (the retrieval of negative data is automatic). The only exceptions to this rule are the MNB and the HFSA. For the performance 
of their basic tasks, these two authorities have access to the complete database in an anonymous manner. 
During the drafting of the Act, it was an important consideration that the database require a data collection obligation not only for 
newly granted loans, but outstanding loans as well due to their high amount. If the data of outstanding contracts were excluded, the 
database would become useful only over the long term, meaning that for the pricing of their loans banks would not be able to obtain 
essential information from the CCIS for years to come. Therefore, a provision was included to the effect that current, outstanding loan 
transactions would also be uploaded as an initial database population; the CCIS will be complete by early May 2012.
In relation to an evaluation of the complete credit registry system, it is important to note that on the basis of the prevailing Act, no 
real credit history of clients can be established. This is because in the case of retrieval, financial institutions may only see the position 
of a client in a given month. However, this problem is partially solved by the provision that, following the expiry of the contract, a 
client may permit the CCIS to store his data for another five years. Accordingly, in the case of a future loan application, he can prove 
that he has duly honoured his earlier contracts.
The MNB played an initiating role in creating provisions about the transparent pricing of mortgages, which entered into force on 1 April 
2012. According to these provisions, mortgages can only be priced as the interest rate is tied to a reference rate, or else it will be 
box 4
the complete credit registry system and transparent pricing of mortgages
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lending to households in Hungary is the weakest in a 
regional comparison. In 2011, lending to households in the 
CEE countries stagnated or increased (Chart 43). By 
contrast, in Hungary it has steadily contracted since the 
onset of the crisis. Although this contraction accelerated 
with early repayments at the end of 2011, household 
lending has otherwise followed a declining trend in Hungary 
as a result of deteriorating demand and strict credit supply.
2.1.3  no tURnaRoUnD in lenDing 
to tHe pRivate sectoR is eXpecteD 
Until enD-2013
Due to deteriorating lending capacity, the decline in 
corporate lending seems to exceed earlier expectations. 
Mainly as a result of the weakening of the domestic banking 
sector’s capacity to lend, our forecast for lending to the 
corporate sector was revised slightly downwards. Lending 
fixed for at least three years. These new rules put an end to the unilateral modifications of interest rates applied by banks and improve 
the transparency and comparability of mortgage loans. It is an important concern whether transparent pricing can be achieved in the 
case of outstanding loans as well, not only for newly granted ones. For success in this, the loan refinancing market needs to become 
stronger and older, opaque loans need to become transparently priced.
The complete credit registry system (especially after the addition of outstanding loan transactions) and the transparent pricing of 
mortgages (especially if the pricing of already existing loans is changed according to the new rules) will be beneficial for competition 
between banks, which can result in decreasing interest rates. At the same time, the low level of credit demand and tight supply reduces 
the positive effects of these new provisions.
structure of key data stored in the central credit Registry
CCR database
Household
Positive data Negative data Identification
Type, conclusion 
of contract's date, 
maturity, amount
Principal 
outstanding
Loan refinancing, 
early repayment 
data
Amount and 
denomination 
of payments
Details on 
refusal of 
consent
Type, conclusion 
of contract's date, 
maturity, amount
Amount, 
instalment, 
currency
Loan refinancing, 
early repayment 
data
Principal 
outstanding
Date, amount,
settlement
of default
Details of 
contract overdue, 
fulfilment
Data on
litigation,
 abuse
Data on
litigation,
 abuse
IdentificationNegative dataPositive data
Corporate
Source: Act CXXII of 2011.
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to corporations by domestic financial intermediaries is 
expected to decline during the entire forecast horizon by 
3.7 percent in 2012 and by nearly 1 percent in 2013 (Chart 
44). In addition to supply constraints, demand factors also 
point to a continued decline. In line with weak economic 
prospects, companies may continue to postpone their 
investment decisions. Consequently, long-term borrowing 
may remain below maturating loans.
besides early repayments, other lending activity may 
also remain low in the household segment. Credit demand 
is expected to remain subdued in the segment due to 
increasingly unfavourable labour market conditions and 
presumably still strong precautionary motives of households. 
Supply constraints have also become stricter; therefore, 
taking everything into account, we expect higher decline in 
loans outstanding in the household segment as well than 
before (Chart 45). Our forecast suggests that, with an 
exchange rate adjustment, household lending may decline 
by 7.7 percent in 2012 and by 1.4 percent in 2013 (3 percent 
and 1.3 percent, respectively, excluding the effects of early 
repayments).
the forecast is accompanied by significant risks, both in 
the positive and negative directions. The activities and 
funding allocations of the euro area banking sector have a 
significant impact on the lending activity of the Hungarian 
banking sector. Accordingly, a favourable impact on the 
developments in lending in Hungary would be if the ECB’s 
3-year lending facility (3-year LTRO) was able to support 
lending by euro area banks, including parent banks’ 
domestic and foreign subsidiaries, to an extent exceeding 
current expectations. The 2-year secured loan announced 
by the MNB in February and the expansion of the range of 
eligible collateral in corporate lending, as well as the 
mortgage bond programme concerning household lending, 
may also be considered as positive risks (Box 5). However, 
negative risks include escalation of the euro area’s sovereign 
debt crisis and the stronger-than-expected deleveraging of 
the euro area banking sector. Moreover, in addition to 
global factors, local risks may also be mentioned. Following 
the crisis, in a regional comparison, Hungarian subsidiaries 
considerably underperformed in terms of profitability. 
Consequently, Hungary’s ability to attract capital and funds 
declined markedly. If parent bank deleveraging is executed 
through a shift in target markets and not proportionally to 
current exposures, a considerable further outflow of 
external funds may occur from the region, including 
Hungary.
stronger deleveraging may result in a greater contraction 
in corporate lending. Stronger deleveraging would 
presumably affect the corporate sector. The proportion of 
chart 44
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short-term loans (40-50 percent) is typically higher in this 
segment, which would allow rapid and considerable 
adjustment (Chart 46). A reduction of corporate loans 
outstanding is also more probable, as much lower margins 
can be realised in this portfolio; hence, the capital 
requirement for corporate loans is two to three times 
higher than for household loans. Short-term loans are 
typically forint loans with a maturity of some months, and 
the majority of them contain revolving credit for working 
capital financing. However, in the case of reductions 
coupled with the withdrawal of external funds, the maturity 
of foreign currency loans may be relevant: based on the 
maturity tables of the banking sector, loans amounting to 
some EUR 4 billion and an additional EUR 1.5 billion will 
expire in 2012 and 2013, respectively.
an increase in the willingness to lend to the sMe sector 
may basically be expected with expansion of guarantee 
programmes in the future as well. Our earlier reports have 
also discussed the particularly negative impact of weakening 
lending activity on the SME sector. Under the present 
circumstances as well, this segment is the most affected by 
restrained lending; for SMEs, as there is typically no 
alternative to bank financing. Therefore, we proposed 
earlier that the role of state guarantee institutions in 
lending to the SME sector should be increased, in spite of 
the fact that the Hungarian figure is already outstanding in 
a regional comparison. This would mean a solution for both 
willingness and capacity to lend, as a state guarantee would 
reduce credit risk and thus the capital requirement as well. 
Presumably, this has induced several countries to 
considerably strengthen the capital of guarantee 
organisations in the recent period (Chart 47).
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At certain stages of the financial and sovereign debt crisis, in addition to their respective interest rate policies, central banks around 
the world made efforts to stimulate the economy, to avoid deflation and to ease market tensions by applying a wide range of 
unconventional monetary policy tools. Generally, with the exception of the ECB, in the first stage of the crisis the world’s major central 
banks reached the zero lower bound. Consequently, they were unable to ease monetary conditions with traditional instruments. In 
addition, in certain cases unconventional monetary policy tools were necessary in order to efficiently treat liquidity tensions and the 
unjustified premia of financial markets, which play an important role in monetary transmission.
The following modes of interventions can be distinguished: liquidity provision facilities, direct credit market or credit easing 
intervention and government bond purchase programmes. Facilities providing liquidity to banks and refinancing transactions (changing 
the frequency and volume of repurchase agreements, broadening the range of eligible collateral, modifying the reserve ratio and 
box 5
the Mnb is ready to apply new instruments to support banks’ lending capatity
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providing foreign exchange liquidity) may be efficient in terms of lending primarily in cases when banks are struggling with difficulties 
in obtaining funds, the funding costs of banks are too high compared to the central bank discount rate, or too many assets have become 
illiquid in the banks’ balance sheets. However, this set of instruments is ineffective if bank lending is limited by banks’ capital positions 
or the reduction of their balance sheets. In the case of direct credit market interventions (purchase of corporate securities and 
mortgage bonds), the central bank directly assumes the credit risk of the private sector. As few countries have a developed securities 
market, practically the central banks of only some developed countries have used this set of instruments. Typically, the highly 
creditworthy central banks that reached a zero lower bound (e.g. Fed, BoE, BoJ) used large-volume government bond purchase 
programmes in order to stimulate aggregate demand and moderate the risk of deflation by reducing longer-term risk-free yields and 
increasing the amount of money in the economy. According to empirical analyses, these programmes were mostly successful in reducing 
yields, but they were not efficient in stimulating aggregate demand and the economy. At the same time as a safety net they could 
hinder a drastic credit crunch.
In the case of emerging countries with a lower credit rating, high external debt and less credible economic policy, there is usually less 
room for manoeuver to apply unconventional instruments. During the recent crisis, emerging countries also applied facilities to provide 
liquidity, but direct credit market interventions and government bond purchases occurred only rarely and in the case of emerging 
markets that were considered more developed. The underlying reason is that the less vulnerable countries embarked on a growth path 
relatively fast, without central bank interest rates reaching their zero lower bound; therefore, these countries did not need monetary 
easing. In more vulnerable emerging countries, however, due to the foreign exchange exposure of domestic sectors and the related 
problems of the banking sector, no major easing of monetary conditions was possible. 
Based on available information, with the exception of the MNB, central banks in the Central and Eastern European region only used 
various types of liquidity-providing, refinancing instruments. Compared to other central banks in the region, the MNB applied its set 
of instruments more intensively. During the crisis, the MNB was the only central bank in the region that, in addition to foreign exchange 
liquidity-improving and forint liquidity-providing instruments, purchased government bonds in the secondary market and announced a 
mortgage bond purchase programme. 
The MNB intends to support the stability of the Hungarian banking sector and, if necessary, increase its capacity to lend with three 
additional instruments announced on 15 February. However, it is important to emphasise that these measures are not suitable for 
influencing banks’ willingness to lend. 
non-conventional monetary policy instruments in the eastern european region during the crisis
coutry instruments used
 Czech Republic
2-week secured loan at base rate + 10 bp
3-month secured loan at base rate + 30 bp 
2-week and 3-month FX swap instrument 
Poland
Longer-term secured loans (longest term 1 year)
FX-swap tenders
Broadening of the range of eligible collateral
EUR/CHF swap arrangement with Swiss national bank
Establishment of euro repo line of EUR 10 billion with the ECB
Romania Lowering of minimum reserve ratio (from 20% to 15% for RON funds)
Hungary
EUR/HUF FX-swap instrument, CHF/EUR one-week swap instrument
3- and 6-month EUR/HUF FX swap instrument
Repo agreement with the ECB
Repeated expansion of range of collateral, introduction of two-week and six-month credit instrument
Lowering of minimum reserve ratio, introduction of optional reserve ratio regime
Government securities purchase on secondary market
Mortgage bond purchase programme 
Source: MNB, national banks of the region.
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In March 2012, the MNB announced a monthly base rate-indexed collateralised loan tender with a maturity of 2 years for credit 
institutions that undertake that, during the term of the loan, their corporate loans outstanding will not decline compared to the value 
at end-December 2011; this also supports an increase in corporate lending. As a result of the new facility, banks may have access to 
long-term funds without a term premium, which may counterbalance the recently observed shortening of maturities on the liability 
side of banks’ balance sheets. Through the attainable improvement in the maturity match, banks’ balance sheets may be strengthened, 
which in turn may offset the decline in capacity to lend.
In order to ease the liquidity constraints that restrain lending, in 2012 the MNB is continuing the expansion of the range of eligible 
collateral, which was started in 2008. Since October 2008, the MNB has accepted corporate and bank bonds with at least ‘BBB−’ credit 
rating as collateral. Following the downgrading of the Hungarian sovereign debt, several state-guaranteed securities ceased to be 
eligible, owing to the credit rating criterion. Starting from April 2012, the MNB’s range of eligible collateral is being expanded with 
corporate and bank bonds whose credit rating corresponds to or is more favourable than that of the Hungarian State. As of the same 
date, the MNB also accepts as collateral those corporate, bank and mortgage bonds that meet other eligibility criteria and are issued 
in any regulated market or non-regulated markets accepted by the MNB, in addition to the BSE. Earlier, in its credit operations the 
central bank only accepted forint-denominated securities, with the exception of local government bonds. Following the sovereign 
downgrade, the euro-denominated securities of some Hungarian issuers, primarily those of the Hungarian State, were excluded from 
the ECB’s range of eligible collateral, reducing the liquidity buffer of credit institutions. In this situation, the MNB is able to offset the 
negative liquidity effect of the downgrade by accepting as eligible collateral those foreign exchange bonds issued by the Hungarian 
State or Hungarian companies that meet the criteria similar to those of forint-denominated bonds. 
In household mortgage lending, the mortgage bond market plays a key role in banks’ funding and the improvement of maturity 
mismatches. Based on the experiences of the MNB’s 2010 mortgage bond purchase programme, the central bank can efficiently support 
banks’ fundraising related to mortgage lending with market purchases only in the case of adequate willingness to issue. To stimulate 
lending to households, the MNB intends to launch a universal mortgage bond purchase programme, following an amendment to 
legislation in agreement with the government that allows universal mortgage bond issuance.
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2.2.1  steaDily DeteRioRating 
poRtfolio QUality in tHe 
coRpoRate segMent
the ratio of non-performing corporate loans continued 
to rise in 2011 as well, reaching over 17 percent. Since 
our last Report, weak economic growth, the depreciation of 
the forint and the steady shrinking of the loan portfolio 
have led to a rising proportion of non-performing corporate 
loans in the banking system. As a result, the NPL ratio was 
over 17 percent at end-December 2011 (Chart 48), 
representing a 4 percentage point increase over a year 
earlier. The underlying reasons for such a significant 
deterioration were delinquent project loans and the 
significantly weaker performance of other corporate loans 
in 2011 Q4. Even stronger-than-usual portfolio cleaning was 
unable to prevent significant deterioration in the final 
quarter. The fact that deterioration mainly affected those 
banks that have large exposures and whose portfolio quality 
was already rather poor adds to systemic risks (Chart 49).
2.2  portfolio quality may deteriorate further 
in the corporate segment; however, the 
exchange rate cap scheme may help prevent 
the build-up of new defaults in the household 
segments
As a consequence of the deteriorating real economic outlook, non-performing loans continued to rise in the corporate 
segment in 2011 H2. The ratio of 90-day overdue loans exceeded 17 percent by the end of the year. Parallel with a rise in 
non-performing loans, loan loss provisioning also went up. Therefore, loan loss coverage increased significantly, which is 
favourable in terms of prudential point of view. However, asymmetry in coverage among banks continues to pose risks. 
From a forward-looking perspective, shrinking loan portfolios, slow portfolio cleaning and poor economic growth may 
trigger a further increase in the ratio of non-performing corporate loans in the next two years, such that it may exceed 
20 percent.
Portfolio quality also continued to deteriorate in the household segment in 2011 H2. Deterioration can be attributed mostly 
to the fact that the early repayment of FX loans at preferential fixed exchange rates led to a reduction in total household 
loan portfolio. The ratio of 90-day overdue loans was 13.1 percent at the end of December. Banks’ loan losses incurred on 
household loans rose significantly due to the early repayment of FX loans; excluding that effect, there should have been 
a decline in 2011 H2. There was a slight increase in the loan loss coverage of household loans at a banking system level. 
As depreciation of the forint resulted in an increased LTV, adequate coverage is of the utmost importance. From a forward-
looking perspective, we anticipate a broadly flat or somewhat higher ratio of non-performing household loans. Lower 
instalments, resulting from the exchange rate cap scheme available for debtors as of 1 April, may counterbalance the 
adverse impact of a decline in the number of creditworthy customers on the share of non-performing loans due to early 
repayment.
chart 48
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sizeable amount of restructured loans means further 
risks in the corporate portfolio. The significant amount of 
restructured corporate loans makes the picture of portfolio 
quality even bleaker. As of end-December 2011, over 25 
percent of renegotiated loans were already non-performing. 
Taking into account restructured loans that were not yet 90 
days past due, which amounted to 6.5 percent at the end of 
December 2011, 25 percent of corporate loans are now 
problem debt. A nearly indispensable condition for 
restructured loans to again become performing ones is 
marked acceleration in economic growth, which remains to 
be seen.
a rapid rise in the ratio of non-performing loans went 
hand in hand with higher loan losses in the corporate 
portfolio. Compared with 2.5 percent in 2010, cost of 
provisioning stood at an overall 4.16 percent as a proportion 
of the total portfolio (Chart 50). Reaching an annualised 4 
percent, risk cost was the highest ever to date. Such high 
cost was imputable to a significantly deteriorating portfolio. 
Not counting portfolio cleaning, the NPL ratio rose by over 
2 percentage points in 2011 H2, significantly adding to 
expected losses. In the last quarter, in response to a rapidly 
depreciating forint exchange rate and increasingly bleak 
real economic prospects, banks have likely revised their 
expectations for the performance of their portfolio. 
Furthermore, capital injections by parent banks also 
provided more room for certain financial institutions to 
absorb higher losses.
loan loss coverage rose throughout 2011 at the banking 
sector level, thus reducing prudential risks. Loan loss 
coverage for the total corporate loan portfolio in the 
banking sector rose to 50 percent (Chart 51). In our earlier 
analyses, we consistently urged higher loan loss coverage 
for non-performing loans; thus, from a financial stability 
perspective, the fact that this ratio grew by nearly 10 
percentage points last year is favourable. A rise in loan loss 
coverage reduces further possible losses and the amount of 
non-performing loans to be refinanced. Thus, it is a 
favourable trend in respect of both solvency and liquidity. 
Differences among individual banks remain high. In respect 
to banks heavily engaged in corporate lending, even the 
lowest ratio rose significantly.
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2.2.2  eXclUDing tHe iMpact of  
tHe eaRly RepayMent scHeMe, loan 
losses woUlD Have DeclineD
the ratio of non-performing loans in the household 
segment continued to grow. The ratio of non-performing 
loans 90 days past due to total household loans rose from 
9.5 percent to 13.1 percent in 2011. There was also 
significant growth in the NPL ratio by customers. The ratio 
of non-performing loans increased from 11 percent as of 
end-2010 to 14.8 percent in end-2011 (Chart 52). Nearly half 
of the change in 2011 materialised in the final quarter. 
Clearly, such a significant rise was the result of the early 
repayment of foreign currency denominated loans. The 
underlying reason for the rise in the indicator was the 
drastic contraction in loans outstanding. The early 
repayment scheme accounted for 86 percent of this 
contraction in the last quarter. If the portfolio had remained 
unchanged, the indicator would only have risen by 0.3 
percentage point in the final quarter (Chart 53).
foreign currency portfolio deteriorated mainly in 2011. 
Examining the portfolio quality by product breakdown 
confirms our former picture. There was hardly any increase 
in the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans in respect 
of HUF-denominated mortgage loans. By contrast, the ratio 
of foreign currency denominated mortgage loans rose from 
9.6 percent to 14.3 percent in the final quarter (Chart 54). 
It is important to stress, however, that an increase in 
impaired loans was prevailing throughout 2011 as a result of 
the appreciation of the Swiss franc (Box 6). By contrast, 
there was hardly any change in amount of non-performing 
HUF loans, and even its impact on the NPL indicator was 
mitigated by HUF loans granted for refinancing early 
repayment of FX loans. 
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A number of methods have been used to identify the reasons for 
a sharp rise in non-performing FX housing loans and to assess the 
extent to which these reasons are responsible for the rise. During 
the crisis, some banks asked their non-performing customers 
directly whether it was the loss of their jobs or an increase in 
their instalments that had led to payment problems. However, 
these statistics are far from being comprehensive and generally 
they are rarely made public. Moreover, it is hard to assess the 
quality of data collection. In their paper published in 2011, Katalin 
Gáspár and Zsuzsa Varga used a simulation method to analyse the 
issue.11 Relying on the HCSO’s labour survey and household budget 
survey for 2008 data, they simulated a rise in the instalments of 
household loans and trends in household income. Based on this, 
nearly half of the assumed debt repayment difficulties were due 
to already strained household budgets; job losses accounted for 
less than 10 percent of default events.
In addition to direct questionnaire surveys and simulation, the use of econometric models is a third possible method of analysing the 
causes of default. In the latter case, we seek to identify statistical relations between various data on default and variables specific to 
the economy. Dependent variables are mainly the volume of non-performing loans, the ratio of non-performing loans, and the fact of 
payment arrears. Similar to our stress test, we use the Cox hazard model, taking into account the individual characteristics of debtors 
and loans, as well as the age of the loan, in estimating the probability of default (PD). The age of loans is especially important because 
empirical analyses reveal that PD is the highest in the first few years. This period provides evidence whether or not debtors are 
overstretched, whether they are willing to pay and if their labour market and income position is stable enough. Such problems are 
likely to be faced in any credit portfolio, with the extent being subject to the rigour of creditworthiness assessment. In carrying out 
stress tests, we estimate the probability of default (i.e. the probability of being at least 90-days delinquent). This model contains, in 
addition to customer and loan product characteristics and the age of loans, variables describing macroeconomic conditions. For this 
exercise, we used the average interest rate applied to CHF housing loans rather than the interbank rates used in stress tests. We fixed 
a reference situation, which assumes the perseverance of the 
average interest rate, exchange rate and employment levels as of 
September 2008; we used this benchmark to assess partial effects 
in a multiplicative functional form. Accordingly, the partial impact 
of the exchange rate in any given period gives an indication of the 
extent, expressed in percentages, to which PD would deviate from 
the value in macro-economic circumstances selected as a 
benchmark if, relative to the benchmark, only the exchange rate 
were changed. The combined impact of all the macro-economic 
factors is the product of partial impacts.
In order to be able to apply the results of modelling PD to non-
performing loans, we provided a quarterly time series adjusted 
for the exchange rate and the impact of portfolio cleaning of non-
performing loans. Then, consistent with the extent that the 
model sample revealed, we formulated simple assumptions for 
the ratio of non-performing loans that had begun performing 
box 6
Reasons underlying the default of foreign currency denominated housing loans
the partial effect of macroeconomic variables on the 
probability of default
Se
p
. 
08
N
ov
. 
08
Ja
n.
 0
9
M
ar
. 
09
M
ay
 0
9
Ju
ly
 0
9
Se
p
. 
09
N
ov
. 
09
Ja
n.
 1
0
M
ar
. 
10
M
ay
 1
0
Ju
ly
 1
0
Se
p
. 
10
N
ov
. 
10
Ja
n.
 1
1
M
ar
. 
11
M
ay
 1
1
Ju
ly
 1
1
Se
p
. 
11
N
ov
. 
11
Per cent
−20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
−20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180 Per cent
Total effect
Employment
Exchange rate
FX interest rate
Source: MNB.
the quarterly distribution of partial impacts
08
 Q
4
09
 Q
1
09
 Q
2
09
 Q
3
09
 Q
4
10
 Q
1
10
 Q
2
10
 Q
3
10
 Q
4
11
 Q
1
11
 Q
2
11
 Q
3
11
 Q
4
Per cent
−20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
−20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Per cent
Other
Employment
FX interest rate
Exchange rate
Term of interaction
Source: MNB.
11  GásPár Katalin anD VarGa ZsuZsa (2011), ‘A bajban lévő lakáshitelesek elemzése mikroszimulációs modellezéssel’, [An analysis of distressed home loan 
borrowers by means of micro-simulation modelling], Közgazdasági Szemle, 53. évf. június.
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the early final repayment scheme led to banks incurring 
extremely high losses on household loans. With a slightly 
increasing non-performing portfolio, loan loss provisioning 
rose significantly. The increase to 5.55 percent at the end 
of the year was due exclusively to losses incurred owing to 
the early final repayment scheme. The scheme resulted in 
banks recognising a total of HUF 150 billion in loan losses in 
the fourth quarter. Aside from this and charge-offs, the 
indicator would be 2.2 percent, representing the decline 
over last year (Chart 55) 
loan loss coverage for non-performing loans grew in 
2011. Banks that are major players in household lending 
increased their loan loss coverage for non-performing loans 
in 2011. As a result, the system-level indicator rose from 
approximately 35 percent in 2010 to 40 percent by end-
2011. It should be mentioned that exchange rate depreciation 
also raised the LTV ratio in the banking system. The average 
LTv ratio for housing loans was 72 percent; within that, the 
ratio for FX loans stood at 84 percent. The LTv ratio for 
non-performing loans exceeds 120 percent.
again. The resulting quarterly new non-performing loan ratio was broken down according to the proportions that the model had 
revealed. Partial impacts had been available in the form of a product, but we needed sums; while translating the product into sums, 
besides using partial impacts, we also created a new category consisting of the interactions of macro-variables. Besides applying the 
proportions that the model had revealed, we also allocated the residual of the estimate to the individual categories; as a result, an 
error term did not surface in the calculations. It is important in the evaluation of results that the employment variable measures the 
number of employees and does not show decreases in income due to part-time employment or other reasons. In that case, the effect 
of labour market conditions might be underestimated and the other parts might be overestimated. 
Our results show that the ratio of non-performing loans would be 
less than half of what it is now if, in response to the financial 
crisis, the exchange rate of the forint had not depreciated, 
unemployment had not increased and interest rates had not risen. 
Loose pre-crisis credit conditions alone would have led to a rapid 
surge in the ratio of non-performing loans. This situation was 
exacerbated further by the crisis. It was mainly during the first 
phase of the crisis that higher unemployment led to a higher 
proportion of non-performing loans. As regards loan interest rates 
and the exchange rate of the forint, they both triggered a rise. 
Persistently high interest rates increased the probability of 
default and the successive waves of forint depreciation also had 
an adverse impact. The interaction factor mostly comprises the 
depreciation of the forint exchange rate and the rising interest 
rate, so this factor is mainly associated with higher instalments as 
well. Overall, the rise in instalments affected debt service more 
than higher unemployment.
the partial breakdown of non-performing fX housing 
loans according to the likely reason of nonperformance
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2.2.3  DeteRioRating coRpoRate 
loan poRtfolio QUality anD peaK 
in tHe non-peRfoRMing Ratio 
witHin tHe HoUseHolD segMent
Due to weak growth prospects and slow portfolio 
cleaning, the ratio of non-performing loans will not peak 
in the corporate segment in the forecast horizon. Due to 
the deteriorating growth prospects for 2012, the non-
performing loan ratio will exceed 22 per cent at the end of 
2013, which is higher than our earlier expectations (Chart 
56). A higher non-performing loan ratio is partly attributable 
to the fact that the PD of corporate loans will increase in 
2012 and only start decreasing from 2013. Furthermore, the 
corporate loan portfolio will shrink over the forecast 
horizon, which also implies a higher ratio. The ratio of loan 
losses to the total portfolio is expected to decline over the 
next two years; an anticipated 2.5 per cent of loan loss 
provisioning will be similar to the figures seen in 2009−2010.
with a steady decline in loan losses, the ratio of non-
performing loans will peak in early 2013 in the household 
segments. We expect the non-performing ratio to rise 
further in the household segment in 2012. This is due in 
part to a significant shrinking of the performing loan 
portfolio, triggered by the early repayment scheme, and in 
part to slow portfolio cleaning. From mid-2012, the exchange 
rate fixation scheme (Box 7) is likely to reduce the PD of 
foreign currency mortgage loans. The non-performing ratio 
will peak at 15 per cent in early 2013 (Chart 57), since 
portfolio cleaning, which is expected to accelerate due to 
higher quotas on distressed sales and the operation of the 
National Asset Management Company, will be able to offset 
the decreasing volume of new defaults (Chart 58). Lower 
PDs will also lead to lower loan losses on household loans.
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On 15 December 2011, the Government and the Banking Association concluded an agreement, the main objectives of which were to 
find a solution to the situation of household debtors with foreign currency mortgage loans and to restore co-operation between the 
parties. The impact of the agreement was discussed and assessed in detail in the December 2011 issue of the MNB’s Quarterly Report 
on Inflation. The main components of the agreement, which have been implemented in legislation and certain parts of which have 
been changed since then, are as follows:
A.  Conditions of the early repayment scheme were tightened, and banks can deduct 30 per cent of the losses they incur due to early 
repayment from their 2011 bank levy.
B.  Based on the situation as of 30 September 2011, banks convert the foreign currency mortgage loans of defaulted borrowers (with at 
least 90-day overdue payments of over HUF 78,000) into forint loans and cancel 25 per cent of the converted debt if the debtor 
requests so and the value of the real property serving as collateral did not exceed HUF 20 million at the time of loan origination. 
Tapping its FX reserves, the MNB provides the foreign exchange needed for the conversion, which is to be performed by 31 August 
2012. Banks can deduct 30 per cent of the cancelled debt from their 2012 bank levy. The state provides interest subsidy for eligible 
means-tested debtors for five years. The real property and debt of those in the most desperate situations will be taken over by 
end-2014 by the National Asset Management Company established by the state. This scheme will cover over 25,000 residential 
properties and be implemented in several phases.
C.  Performing FX loan borrowers will be covered by the revised version of an earlier exchange rate fixation scheme. Pursuant to this, 
performing FX loan borrowers will be allowed to service their loans at an exchange rate that is lower than the actual market rate 
(HUF/CHF 180, HUF/EUR 250 and HUF/JPY 2.5) for five years, but not longer than June 2017. Given the current exchange rates, this 
reduction equal to CHF, EUR and JYP is approximately 25, 13 and 6 per cent respectively. Eligibility for admission into the scheme 
depends on debt upon disbursement not exceeding HUF 20 million. Applications for the scheme will be accepted before end-
December 2012. Borrowers can enter into the scheme according to a staged schedule: public sector employees can apply from April 
2012, debtors with housing loans other than public sector employees from June 2012, and mortgage debtors with home equity loans 
from September 2012. In addition to eligibility for the scheme, public sector employees are also granted a one-off transfer by the 
state. Participants in the scheme share the difference between the fixed exchange rate and the actual exchange rate in a manner 
that, within the difference, the principal part of the instalment is recorded on a separate HUF technical account under the debtor’s 
name, while the interest part of the instalment is shared 50/50 by the state and banks. Debtors will need to start settling the 
difference that accrues on their separate HUF accounts after a grace period of five years (during which exchange rates are fixed), 
according to a repayment schedule corresponding to the term of the original loan. All exchange rate differentials above a certain 
exchange rate (HUF/CHF 270, HUF/EUR 340 and HUF/JPY 3.3) will be borne by the state.
D.  Consistent with the original plan, the government has undertaken to reduce the bank levy to 50 per cent of the current rate in 2013 
and phase it out in 2014 (it will levy the bank tax at a rate adopted by the EU or identical to the member state average). 
Furthermore, banks may deduct loans granted to SMEs in connection with the financing of EU support and new home loans from the 
base of the bank tax liability. The parties are also committed to further consultations.
As regards the assessment of the impact of the agreement, borrowers’ behaviour is still a moot question. We assume that:
•  90-100 per cent of eligible performing borrowers will take advantage of the fixed exchange rate scheme, as this does not entail their 
having to waive any of their rights (e.g. the right of early payment).
•  The situation is much more complex in the case of defaulted debtors: First, only 60 per cent of total non-performing loans meet the 
quantitative application criteria; secondly, a recent law amendment has excluded debtors with an already terminated loan contract 
from the program, (although there are still legal uncertainties about this issue). Additional uncertainties include whether all eligible 
debtors will avail themselves of having their debt converted into HUF; if they do, their monthly instalments would hardly decrease, 
due to the higher HUF interest rates. Despite debt relief, they would realise the exchange rate losses incurred so far. For the time 
box 7
agreement between the government and the banking association
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being, the pricing of new HUF loans (i.e. former FX loans converted into HUF loans) is still shrouded with a great degree of 
uncertainty: As this is not part of the agreement, it cannot be ruled out that interest on new loans will be so prohibitively high that, 
debt relief notwithstanding, conversion will not be a sensible option for debtors. Overall, our estimate for the participation rate is 
approximately 20-30 per cent of the total non-performing loans, at a maximum.
Fundamentally, the agreement favourably affects financial stability for the following reasons:
•  The mere fact that the government and banks decided to put aside their contentions to seek a compromise is a favourable 
development.
•  The fixed rate scheme is another favourable development. Although the FX position of FX debtors will not cease, because debtors will 
have to continue to service their debts at the actual market rate once the period of fixed exchange rates is over, the amount of the 
instalments will be 25-30 per cent lower than the current one during the period of fixation. This may halt last year’s trend of consistent 
deterioration in the quality of household loans. Contrary to last summer’s version of the fixed exchange rate scheme, under the new 
scheme a significant part of the exchange rate differential will be borne by the state and the banks. Therefore, the amount of the 
exchange rate differential to be borne by debtors will not be unbearably high, despite a longer grace period. (For loans with an average 
outstanding maturity of 15 years, approximately 30 per cent of the exchange rate differential will have to be borne by debtors.) As a 
result, there will only be a less than 10 per cent increase in the amount of instalments even after the fixed rate period (provided that 
exchange rates remain unchanged). Although this will represent a significant rise compared to the instalments during the fixed rate 
period. Taking into consideration the staged schedule for applications, the fixed exchange rate scheme is expected to reduce the debt 
burden and, hence, the available income of debtors by a total of HUF 35-40 billion (of which close to HUF 30 billion will be a transfer 
from banks and the state). In 2013, calculated at the current exchange rate, the reduction in the debt burden may amount to HUF 80 
billion. Banks and the state will have to absorb an annualised amount of HUF 25 billion each. 
•  Another favourable development is that the National Asset Management Company established to address the distressed situation of 
socially vulnerable debtors will take over the loans and real properties of 25,000 debtors from banks, compared with the earlier estimate 
of 5,000 debtors. By operating the company, the state will be able to find a solution to the situation of approximately 20 per cent of 
the defaulted debtors until 2014. That said, the fiscal impacts of the scheme are still hard to assess. In our estimate, HUF 100 billion 
will be needed for the scheme to be financed, with anticipated annual financial costs amounting to HUF 4-6 billion at most.
•  The agreement has also been engineered to encourage lending, which is another favourable intention. However, the current rate of 
the tax relief intended to boost lending is unlikely to generate a marked pick-up in banks’ lending activity.
The agreement notwithstanding, there are still substantial risks, especially in the following issues:
•  As regards defaulted debtors, it is still a moot question whether 25 per cent debt forgiveness is sizeable enough for the restoration 
of solvency of those debtors who can and are willing to participate in the scheme. As FX loans will be converted into HUF loans, 
interest charged to customers will increase. As a result, debtors’ monthly burden will hardly decline despite the 25 per cent debt 
relief. The interest subsidy granted by the state can only temporarily and not sufficiently mitigate this burden. As a result, there is 
a considerable risk that debtors who become insolvent, mainly due to becoming unemployed, will not be able to honour their new 
obligations either, and that they will default again. All in all, this feature of the programme does not offer a proper solution to the 
situation of troubled debtors.
•  Furthermore, the agreement does not address the issue of litigation (court cases) between the state and banks in relation to claims 
that banks have filed for the compensation of losses stemming from the early repayment scheme. If the courts find against the state, 
such a ruling will cause a significant fiscal shock and lead to a shift in burden-sharing between the state and the banks at the expense 
of the former. As was pointed out in the Report on Inflation, with regard to the joint impact of the early repayment scheme and the 
agreement, this burden-sharing is currently balanced.
•  Finally, the exchange rate fixation scheme will not put an end to risks stemming from the exchange rate exposure of FX loan debtors; 
it will only put off the problem. If the exchange rate depreciates, then with the expiration of the grace period, customers are likely to 
default en masse and incur significant losses (following hidden tension that mounted during the grace period) to the banking system.
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the ratio of non-performing loans is high even in 
international comparison; for the time being, however, 
the banking system can still manage this. A steady rise in 
the NPL ratio sets Hungary apart from the rest of the 
Visegrád countries. The level of the ratio is among the 
highest in Europe (Chart 59). The issue is ameliorated by the 
fact that, due to a relatively long build-up of the current 
NPLs, losses are materialising over a longer time horizon. 
Due to these losses, additional capital was raised by several 
banks; therefore, lending capacity is far less hindered by 
capital position. The high level of the NPL ratio, nevertheless, 
may still hinder any recovery of lending because the large 
stock of NPLs absorbs funds that could be used for financing 
new loans. 
the cleaning of non-performing corporate loans from 
balance sheets is rather unlikely under the current 
circumstances. Domestic companies engaged in work-out 
are facing liquidity constraints; furthermore, a significant 
difference between prices asked by sellers and offered by 
buyers makes transactions impossible. Foreign companies 
with significant capital and, hence, purchase potential are 
not interested in most regional countries, among them 
Hungary, due in part to low volumes and in part to an 
uncertain legal environment.
fundamentally, changes in the regulatory environment 
are indispensable for faster portfolio cleaning. Current 
regulations encourage the bankruptcy of corporate clients 
with impaired loans. Generally, liquidation is a protracted 
process. In order to facilitate portfolio cleaning, liquidation 
and insolvency procedures should be accelerated and the 
seizure of assets serving as collateral should be streamlined. 
It would be equally important to seek out-of-court 
arrangements. Towards this end, barriers to efficient 
restructuring (e.g. tax laws) should be dismantled and out-
of-court arrangements should be applied more extensively 
in line with international practice (Box 8). 
the institution of personal bankruptcy should be 
introduced. The adoption of personal bankruptcy or the 
refinement of an existing one formed an important part of 
policy responses to earlier crises in other countries. 
Therefore, we strongly suggest that personal bankruptcy 
would help manage non-performing loans more efficiently, 
allow insolvent debtors the possibility to start anew and 
facilitate responsible lending practices in becoming more 
widespread. Therefore, this should be introduced in the 
household segment.
chart 59
share of non-performing loans in total loans in international 
comparison 
(June 2011)
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The vast amount of non-performing corporate loans on the balance sheets of banks is to a large extent attributable to the Hungarian 
business and legal environment, steering undertakings that have a viable business model but have defaulted on their loans towards 
liquidation by means of court proceedings. It would be more preferable for both the economy and the banks if defaulted borrowers 
could avoid, as much as possible, enforcement through legal proceedings and viable companies could be kept in operation through 
reorganisation or partial debt relief. 
International best practices of corporate reorganisation include the so-called London Approach and INSOL Principles (International 
Association of Restructuring, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Professionals), which rely on the voluntary cooperation of creditors. Under 
this arrangement, a voluntary group of creditors makes a proposal for the financial restructuring of the enterprise and the borrower 
must cooperate with the creditors, disclosing all information and thereby facilitating a clear understanding of its financial and asset 
position. When these principles were first introduced, a third-party intermediary was involved in the process. As the principles became 
part of the general business culture, however, that role became redundant. 
Based on the London Approach, the Budapest Principles were introduced in Hungary in 2010 under the auspices of the Hungarian 
Banking Association. Even though the principles represent a step in the right direction, in the present Hungarian environment the 
approach has failed to live up to the expectations, often due to insufficient cooperation between creditors and borrowers. The absence 
of cooperation often comes from mutual distrust, which could be addressed through the involvement of an independent mediator in 
the process.
In the context of the legal environment, the tax rules concerning 
debt relief are worth mentioning as they may present significant 
obstacles to reorganisation. At present, debt forgiveness is not an 
acceptable method for the restoration of solvency for borrowers 
because the debtor must pay income tax on the amount forgiven 
while the bank needs to add the same sum to its taxable income. 
This issue is known to legislators; indeed, the relevant laws have 
been temporarily amended for purposes of the early repayment 
scheme. To make the write-off of debt workable in the case of 
over-indebted companies, the taxation rules should be amended 
so that the amount forgiven is not part of the taxable income of 
the participants in the reorganisation. 
Increasing the efficiency of liquidation proceedings could 
effectively promote the removal of companies beyond recovery 
from the portfolio. In Hungary, liquidation through the courts is 
extremely slow and expensive in international comparison, while 
the process is often not sufficiently transparent. This is one of the 
reasons why debtors can easily hide the assets of their company, resulting in a low recovery rate. In developed countries, liquidation 
is concluded within approximately one year and it costs less than 10 per cent of the value of corporate assets; as a result, creditors 
recover more than 60-90 percent of their debt. In contrast, in Hungary the procedure takes two years on average (or much longer, even 
4-5 years, in the case of complex, high-volume arrangements), it costs 15 per cent of the value of corporate assets and creditors recover 
less than 40 per cent of the loans. 
International experience12 also indicates that in the course of the crisis, several countries implemented major legislative changes to 
promote out-of-court arrangements as well as to strengthen the rights of creditors and to improve the efficiency and transparency of 
insolvency proceedings. Such measures would substantially improve workout procedures in Hungary as well.
box 8
How to improve the efficiency of corporate portfolio cleaning in Hungary
cost and time span of insolveny procedures in 
international comparison
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12 Based on the reform database of the World Bank; for details, see: http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms/overview/topic/resolving-insolvency. 
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2.2.4  Halt in tHe DeteRioRation 
of tHe poRtfolio QUality of 
financial fiRMs anD cReDit 
co-opeRatives
the ratio of financial firms’ npls to total loans stopped 
increasing in the final quarter of 2011. After rising in H1, 
the NPL ratio stopped increasing at the end of 2011 (Chart 
60). Based on the final quarter, it is still too early to say 
that it was a turning point, given that similar stagnation was 
experienced at the end of 2010. Taking into account the 
year as a whole, the ratio of NPLs grew by close to 5 
percentage points, which entailed serious losses. Loan 
losses exceeded 3.5 per cent (i.e. they were higher than in 
2010). In response, loan loss coverage for NPLs increased, 
reaching 60 per cent at sectoral level. 
the portfolio quality of the credit co-operative sector 
also deteriorated further in 2011. The quality of both 
household and corporate portfolio deteriorated in the 
credit co-operative sector in 2011 H1. This deterioration 
seems to have stopped in the second half of the year. The 
increase in the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
remained below 1 percentage point in this period. Despite 
slower deterioration, loan loss provisioning seen in the first 
half of the year continued; as a result, loan loss coverage 
for NPLs grew in the second half of the year. The NPL ratio 
of household loans at end-2011 was identical to the June 
level. The early repayment scheme did not hit the credit 
co-operatives hard because FX lending was only a marginal 
activity. On the contrary, the scheme benefited them due 
to the good quality of the disbursed loans. Loan losses 
increased in 2011, as a result the earlier level of loan loss 
coverage remained sufficient despite the deteriorating 
portfolio (Table 3 and Table 4).
chart 60
share of non-performing loans in the financial corporations’ 
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table 3
Major quality indicators of the corporate loan portfolio held by credit co-operatives
per cent 2008 2009 2010 H1 2010 H2 2011 H1 2011 H2
Share of 90 days past due loans to total loans 12.8 13.8 17.8 17.3 25.0 25.9
Coverage ratio 40.9 42.9 35.0 35.2 30.4 32.2
Loan loss provisioning in the share of total loans 1.2 1.3 − 1.9 2.3 2.0
Source: MNB.
table 4
Major quality indicators of the household loan portfolio held by credit co-operatives
per cent 2008 2009 2010 H1 2010 H2 2011 H1 2011 H2
Share of 90 days past due loans to total loans 9.1 11.0 13.0 13.8 16.9 17.0
Coverage ratio 47.9 50.6 46.7 46.6 45.3 46.2
Loan loss provisioning in the share of total loans 0.9 1.3 − 1.2 1.1 1.7
Source: MNB.
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Mainly in response to the escalating sovereign debt crisis 
in the euro area, an outflow of foreign funds from 
domestic banks began in 2011 H2. As a response to the 
termination of the EU/IMF agreement, parent bank 
maintenance of exposures under the Vienna Initiative was 
terminated, effective from June 2010. Accordingly, the first 
Vienna Initiative was unable to prevent a swift outflow of 
foreign funds. After a temporary lull in the first half of 2011, 
a new phase of the sovereign debt crisis accelerated the 
pace of the withdrawal of foreign funds.
foreign funds in the Hungarian banking sector decreased 
faster than elsewhere in the region. As opposed to 
Hungary, where the withdrawal of funds accelerated in 2011 
Q4 (Chart 61 and Chart 62), most regional countries 
experienced stagnation or only moderate outflows. 
Following the HUF 1,700 billion outflow in 2010, HUF 1,800 
billion was withdrawn from the banking sector in 2011, 
making a total of HUF 3,500 billion (or over EUR 12 billion) 
and representing close to a 30 percent decline over one and 
a half years. It should be added, though, that EUR 6 billion, 
the largest nominal amount in the region, has been 
withdrawn from Poland since June 2011. Moreover, there is 
a significant difference between the regional countries 
included in the comparison in terms of their reliance on 
foreign funds. Thus, the joint exposure to Poland and 
Hungary is significantly higher than that of the rest of the 
countries combined.
2.3  the fX need stemming from outflow of 
external funds is covered by an increasing fX 
swap exposure, suggesting excessive 
withdrawals
The domestic banking sector underwent substantial balance sheet contraction between 2009 and 2011. In the second half 
of 2011, this was coupled with an acceleration in the outflow of foreign funds. Banks’ reliance on the FX swap market and 
the MNB’s swap facilities increased markedly in response to an outflow of foreign funds that was faster than the decrease 
in foreign currency denominated assets, the conversion of private sector foreign currency denominated deposits into HUF 
ones, and the significant depreciation of the HUF exchange rate. As a consequence, the exchange rate sensitivity of the 
domestic banking sector’s liquidity position rose significantly.
The funding difficulties of the euro area financial system and the deteriorating profitability of the domestic banking sector 
pose key challenges to the banking sector. The deleveraging of parent banks in Europe and a low level of the domestic 
banking sector’s competitiveness may lead to an excessive withdrawal of foreign funds. As a result, the risk that an outflow 
of foreign funds becomes the cause rather than the consequence of subdued lending may materialise. The adverse impacts 
of an outflow of foreign funds could be mitigated by stronger reliance on domestic deposits. An increase in the proportion 
of long-term savings could be boosted by the establishment of a universal model of issuing mortgage bonds and the start 
of a programme where the central bank purchases universal mortgage bonds.
chart 61
changes in foreign funds relative to June 2010 in regional 
comparison
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from a liquidity perspective, three major factors made 
feasible the decrease in foreign funding since June 2010. 
The domestic banking sector managed to finance the 
withdrawn foreign FX funds mainly through a decline in 
private sector lending and, to a lesser extent, through a rise 
in deposits and by means of a temporary reduction in liquid 
assets as well (deposits with the MNB and government 
securities denominated in HUF) (Chart 63). The latter was 
made possible by the fact that domestic banks accumulated 
abundant (HUF) liquidity before June 2010. This means that 
banks sometimes depleted excess liquidity from maturing 
loans and new deposits to finance the outflow of foreign 
funds. This is exactly what happened at end-2010, mid-2011 
and early 2012.
balance sheet adjustment led to a lower loan-to-deposit 
ratio in Hungary. Although the balance sheet total of the 
domestic banking sector has shrunk materially over the past 
period, its loan-to-deposit ratio of approximately 130 
percent still exceeds the regional average (Chart 64). The 
average ratio for major banks in foreign ownership stands at 
around 150 percent; on a stand-alone basis, this ratio is over 
200 percent for certain banks. This poses significant risks, 
especially in light of the fact that, increasingly strict 
regulatory and investor expectations for capitalisation may 
trigger further forced balance sheet adjustments at parent 
banks and, hence, their subsidiaries. At the same time, the 
ratio was notably influenced by exchange rate movements, 
as the majority of loans (contrary to deposits) are 
denominated in foreign currencies. Furthermore, lower 
balance sheet totals due to final repayments contributed to 
the indicator only to a lesser extent, because a significant 
portion of loans was financed from deposits.
the withdrawal of foreign funds may easily become the 
cause rather than the consequence of subdued lending. 
It is very difficult to identify whether the outflow of foreign 
funds is the outcome (consequence) or cause of the 
deleveraging in the domestic banking sector. A regional 
comparison and a significant reduction in foreign funds 
compared with reduction in FX assets (i.e. increasing 
reliance on FX swap markets) suggest a reversal in the 
causal relationship. For liquidity and capital reasons, parent 
banks are making their balance sheets more robust, which 
may in turn lead to a targeted reduction in lending and, 
hence, funds to their subsidiaries. Although the introduction 
of the ECB’s 3-year unlimited LTRO funding facility could 
ease this tension, in light of the above it can only restrain a 
dramatic balance sheet adjustment. As regards the domestic 
banking sector, it is the withdrawal of foreign funds that 
affects the loan-to-deposit ratio and not the other way 
around; and the extent of the withdrawal of funds will be 
excessive. The extent to which this will affect the individual 
chart 62
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chart 63
cumulative changes in the foreign positions of the banking 
sector and branches relative to end-May 2010 
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chart 64
loan-to-deposit ratio of the banking sector and branches in 
regional comparison
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countries will strongly depend on the returns that parent 
bank funds can earn. In this respect, the low profitability of 
the domestic banking sector and unfavourable growth 
prospects are disadvantages when it comes to the regional 
allocation of capital and funds. A further risk materialises 
with the fact that parent banks tend to build in the 
sovereign risk factor of their subsidiaries while calculating 
their financing costs to an increasingly large extent. This 
weakens lending capacity through fewer funds in the 
domestic banking sector.
the adverse impacts of an outflow of foreign funds could 
be mitigated by stronger reliance on domestic deposits. 
Problems may emerge if the withdrawal of foreign funds is 
too fast while domestic deposits and savings build up too 
slowly. The withdrawal of foreign funds would decelerate if 
an agreement were concluded with the EU and the IMF and 
parent banks voluntarily made a commitment to maintain 
their claims from Hungary at a pre-determined level, 
similar to the first Vienna Initiative. Furthermore, the 
restoration of profitability and the competitiveness of the 
domestic banking sector could also improve its ability to 
maintain the level of foreign funds. The placement of 
domestic deposits could be boosted through special deposit 
campaigns and the working out of longer-term saving 
facilities.
in spite of a heavy outflow of funds, the reliance of the 
banking sector on external funds is still significant. The 
loan-to-deposit ratio is still high in international comparison 
(Chart 65). Considering that existing stock comprises 
mainly short-term liabilities (Chart 66) and that domestic 
banks’ funding costs rose significantly in the second half of 
2011, it can be concluded that both the lending capacity 
and the profitability of the banking sector is adversely 
affected already over the short term. Although a decline 
in the share of short-term foreign funds is a favourable 
development, this only relates to the early final repayment 
of FX loans. The conditions of the EUR sale tender 
introduced by the MNB stipulate that the FX granted 
should be used to repay foreign funds first. The risk of 
renewal is cushioned by the fact that the share of parent 
bank financing in foreign funds is a sizeable 64 percent in 
regard to the banking sector as a whole. Although its share 
in respect of banks with foreign ownership is diminishing, 
that is still around 77 percent.
an accelerating outflow of foreign funds since early 2011 
has led to a steady increase in reliance on swap markets. 
FX liabilities decreased faster than FX assets on the balance 
sheet of domestic banks. As a result of this, on-balance 
sheet FX positions have widened. This also points to the 
fact that the withdrawal of foreign funds is now swift, as 
chart 65
foreign fund-to-deposit ratio in regional comparison
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chart 66
Maturity structure of the Hungarian banking sector's foreign 
funds 
(according to remaining maturities)
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banks use up excess liquidity from maturing HUF loans or 
the placement of new deposits, as well as their available 
HUF liquidity reserves, to conclude FX swaps to generate FX 
liquidity and repay foreign funds. The on-balance sheet FX 
position and net FX swap exposure of the banking sector 
continuously rose (by approximately EUR 6 billion or HUF 
1,800-1,900 billion) between March and December 2011 and 
reached a historic peak last seen in March 2009 against the 
backdrop of a rather fragile swap market (Chart 67). The 
outflow of foreign funds account for one third of this rise. 
Although net swap exposure has narrowed since early 2011 
partially due to temporary factors, it is still significantly 
higher than the spring 2011 level.
changes in the on-balance sheet fX position and the fX 
swap stock hedging it were influenced fundamentally by 
three factors. The first is a composition effect, which 
means that customers change the denomination composition 
of their loans or deposits in such a manner that their sum 
remains unchanged (conversion of FX deposits into HUF 
deposits, multicurrency loans). The second is the volume 
effect, which means that on-balance sheet FX position 
changes in response to items (entries) that are coupled with 
an increase or decrease in the balance sheet total. Such an 
effect is generated by a withdrawal of foreign funds by 
means of FX swaps using HUF liquidity. The third factor is 
the exchange rate effect, which means that the value of 
on-balance sheet FX assets and liabilities is translated into 
HUF changes due to changes in exchange rates. Based on 
decomposition, these three factors contributed to an 
increase in the domestic banking sector’s on-balance sheet 
FX position from spring 2011 until the end of the year to a 
roughly equal extent (Chart 68). The volume impact 
(approximately HUF 600 billion) was due to a withdrawal of 
foreign funds to an extent that exceeds reduction in FX 
assets (i.e. one that entails the use of HUF liquidity). Due to 
the early repayment scheme, since the beginning of 20 12 
the decrease in FX assets was larger than the size of foreign 
funds outflow.
the foreign currency that the banking sector needed in 
order to fund the withdrawn foreign funds was provided 
by other non-resident investors and the central bank. 
Exerting a volume impact, the withdrawal of foreign FX 
funds from the banking sector by means of HUF assets may 
occur only if another actor (the other party to the swap 
transaction) has placed foreign exchange liquidity at the 
relevant bank’s disposal. Over the past period, the required 
foreign exchange has fundamentally come from two sources: 
foreign exchange used for the purchase of an increasingly 
sizeable amount of HUF assets held by non-residents in 2011 
H1 (Chart 69) and foreign exchange provided by the MNB in 
connection with the early repayment scheme in 2011 Q4 
chart 67
the total net swap portfolio of the banking sector and the 
branches and their net swap portfolio vis-à-vis non-
residents
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chart 68
Decomposition of the on-balance sheet fX position of the 
banking sector and the branches
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changes in HUf assets held by non-residents relative to 
end-December 2002 and yields of Hungarian government 
securities
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and early 2012, as well as from an increasingly large number 
of central bank swap transactions.
concurrently with an outflow of foreign parent banks’ 
funds, the stock of parent bank swap transactions 
increased. During the period of financial turbulence in late 
2008 and early 2009 when swap markets dried up, parent 
banks substituted for swaps concluded with non-group 
market players, thus providing FX liquidity to their 
subsidiaries. The share of intra-group transactions within 
the gross portfolio rose by 7-9 percent between March 2011 
and end-2011 (Chart 70 and Chart 71). Since 2009, however, 
parent bank swaps have been functioning as an intermediary 
rather than as providers of FX liquidity. This is because 
parent banks have had to act as intermediaries between 
their subsidiaries and non-resident actors, due to limit 
constraints. Some banking groups have been managing 
liquidity centrally for some time now in order to utilise 
limits optimally; in keeping with such central management, 
subsidiaries are not allowed to conclude FX swap transactions 
on their own. All deals are concluded with the intermediation 
of parent banks. Concurrently with the downgrading of the 
country, this trend became increasingly pronounced. Based 
on replies from banks, on a net portfolio basis at least 60 
percent of parent bank swaps are intermediation deals.
there may be two incentives (price and quantity limits) 
driving the downsizing of foreign funds and the build-up 
of an fX swap portfolio. From the perspective of 
profitability, domestic banks may benefit from converting 
foreign funds into FX swap deals and relying on the MNB’s 
swap facilities, despite FX swap market tensions and a 
significant rise in implied yield spreads. Parent bank CDS 
and Hungary’s CDS as an approximation of the price of 
foreign funding is higher (Chart 72) than FX swap market 
spreads and MNB swap spreads. There are limits imposed on 
quantity, though. Irrespective of prices, parent banks 
intend to reduce their respective balance sheet totals. In 
turn, this means downsizing loans to subsidiaries. If 
subsidiaries do not have any maturing FX loans or access to 
FX funds, they have to conclude FX swaps in order to meet 
parent bank expectations.
a further decline in the loan-to-deposit ratio and foreign 
funds can be expected. Based on our forecast for the loan-
to-deposit ratio of the banking sector13, it may fall to 
slightly below 110 percent (Chart 73); however, a significant 
difference between the individual banks in respect to the 
ratio may persist. What influences the pace of the outflow 
of foreign funds is whether banks will resume their earlier 
strategy (i.e. an excessive outflow materialising concurrently 
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share of intra-group deals within the gross swap stock and 
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5-year cDs spreads of parent banks
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with a build-up of FX swaps). If this becomes the case, 
foreign funds should decrease by another EUR 10 billion in 
the coming two years; in turn, swaps would double. The 
pace of the outflow of foreign funds would be slower in the 
baseline scenario that we expect to materialise if liquidity 
risks were mitigated and the portfolio of FX swaps were to 
stop increasing (i.e. foreign funds were repaid only at a 
pace that is identical to the pace of maturing FX assets and 
the placement of new FX deposits). In this case, foreign 
funds would only decrease by a total of EUR 3 billion or 10 
percent in the next two years.
Heavy reliance on swap markets poses a serious risk to 
financial stability. From the perspective of financial 
stability, there are basically three differences between 
direct FX fund raising and swap market hedging. Foreign 
funds provide liquidity, which increases the balance sheet 
total of the banking sector; in contrast, FX swaps only 
change the denomination of existing liquidity without any 
change in total liquidity and balance sheet totals. Another 
important difference is that the maturity of FX swap deals 
has been, generally, shorter than that of foreign funds. As 
a result, the rollover risk is higher compared with foreign 
funds (Chart 74). Finally, taking an FX position is riskier 
from a liquidity point of view, because banks become 
sensitive to exchange rate volatility through margin calls. 
Due to the depreciation of the exchange rate, banks have 
to meet margin requirements to collateralise their FX 
swaps. Margin requirements are determined in foreign 
exchange, which may necessitate the conclusion of another 
FX swap deal, trigger a rise in the portfolio and lead to an 
increasing FX rate sensitivity of banks’ liquidity. From the 
perspective of the central bank, another major risk entailed 
by FX swaps is that strong demand for foreign exchange 
liquidity (volume effect) could trigger a hike in yield 
spreads and a fall in implied HUF yields. This would make 
taking a position against the forint less expensive, leading 
to further depreciation of the exchange rate. In an 
environment of a high or significantly rising FX swap 
portfolio, margin requirements and cheaper speculation 
against the forint together pose a serious risk to financial 
stability. In light of this, introducing a new regulation 
should be considered to prevent the evolvement of further 
swap market risks.
chart 73
banking sector's loan-to-deposit ratio and foreign funds in 
the baseline scenario
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the average remaining maturity of foreign funds and gross 
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Municipality debt owed to the banking system dropped at 
end-2011, due to the assumption of the debt of county 
municipalities by the state. The total amount of 
municipality debt fell to HUF 960 billion at end-2011 (Chart 
75). This decrease was due to the takeover of county 
municipalities’ debt of approximately HUF 170 billion. This 
is the more beneficial as, based on annual obligations and 
income, the finances of large and small villages and county 
municipalities have been the most stressed over the past 
few years.
some 90 per cent of municipality bonds will enter the 
phase of principal repayment by the end 2013. Nearly 50 
per cent of all issued bonds reached the phase of principal 
repayment by end-2011. This proportion will rise to 90 per 
cent in 2012 and 2013 (Chart 76). Our calculations reveal 
that the start of principal repayment will raise the entire 
sector’s debt service by around 20 per cent (HUF 12 billion) 
in 2012. The impact of the appreciation of the Swiss franc 
vis-à-vis the forint on instalments was counterbalanced by 
a lower Swiss base rate. As a result, this contributed to a 
rise in the debt service only to a limited extent. Banks’ 
profitability may be hurt, however, by the lower interest on 
FX-based municipality bonds because the liabilities 
underlying them are re-priced on the basis of CDS spreads.
Restructuring can only temporarily help financially 
stressed municipalities. Debt restructuring can only 
temporarily improve the situation of the municipalities on 
the verge of bankruptcy, because only the pace of 
repayment changes while the overall debt remains the 
same. Nevertheless, with debt restructuring banks can 
charge an interest premium that reflects the altered risk 
profile of the portfolio and its cost of financing. This may 
2.4  government measures mitigated credit 
risks in the municipality segment only partially
The municipality segment became over-indebted in the pre-crisis years. The repayment burden, which increased after the 
grace period, has led to payment difficulties for a rising number of municipalities. Banks seek to prevent an increase in 
the NPL portfolio by debt restructuring, which only temporarily eases tensions in the finances of municipalities. However, 
banks have hardly set aside any loan loss reserves for the recently restructured loans.
The government took several steps to mitigate the sector’s financial woes. The fact that the state assumed the debt of 
county municipalities resolved the situation of the financially most stressed municipalities. Another important change is 
that the newly adopted regulations introduce tighter control over credit operations. As a result, the sector's liabilities can 
only rise moderately. However, for the same reason, municipalities may easily face liquidity problems.
chart 75
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ease tensions in profitability and also points to further 
increase in the interest margin on the foreign interbank 
interest rate.
loan loss provisioning for restructured debt falls behind 
the increase in the portfolio. Currently standing at 4 per 
cent, the 90-day delinquency rate increased markedly last 
year. Banks strive to slow the deterioration in the 
municipality loan portfolio by restructuring. The share of 
restructured loans rose from 0.5 per cent in June 2011 to 5 
per cent by the end of 2011 (Chart 77). While banks set 
aside loan loss provision for the NPL portfolio on an ongoing 
basis, there was practically no change in those for 
restructured debt in 2011. As was pointed out in our earlier 
report, restructured corporate and household loans should 
be covered by higher loan loss provisions , and this also 
holds for municipality loans.
a scheme similar to the exchange rate cap scheme may 
help financially stressed municipalities. However, it also 
carries risks over the long term. One of the banks actively 
engaged in the municipality segment announced a 
programme similar to the exchange rate cap scheme 
introduced for household FX mortgage loans. Municipalities 
can join the programme on a voluntary basis. Participants 
in the programme can repay their debt at a HUF/CHF 200 
exchange rate until end-2014. The difference between the 
prevailing market rate and the capped rate will accrue on a 
separate account. Upon restructuring interest premium on 
bonds will rise. Overall, the total debt service calculated 
until the end of the term of the loan will rise, but the 
repayment burden will be lower until 2014 (Table 5). The 
most important risk inherent in this scheme is that the 
financial mitigation available currently will be charged to 
the budgets subsequent periods (Chart 78).
increasingly severe borrowing limits put further 
indebtedness under control, however, they may also lead 
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table 5
comparison of exchange rate cap within the household and the municipality sector 
exchange rate cap for household 
foreign currency loans
exchange rate cap for local 
government bonds
Total repayment obligation to maturity decreases increases
Interest payment obligation on the buffer account? no yes
Interest on original loan/bond unchanged increases
Interest on the principal between the fixed rate and the market 
rate
shared 50/50 by the bank and the 
state
no sharing
Burden sharing above the specified rate  
(270 HUF/CHF, 340 HUF/EUR, 3.3 HUF/JPY)
the state only no sharing
Duration of exchange rate fixing max. 5 years < 5 years
Source: MNB.
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to liquidity problems. With effect from 1 January 2012, 
municipalities have to obtain the government’s consent in 
order to be able to conclude a transaction incurring debt. 
Exemptions include loans serving as an advance on, own 
funds in respect of development aids from international 
organisations, loans maturing in less than 1 year, 
reorganisation loans and loans in an amount not exceeding 
the certain threshold levels prescribed for different types 
of settlement . Borrowing conditional on government 
approval and low threshold values represent significant 
tightening. Debt service may become increasingly difficult 
for those financially stressed municipalities whose 
institutions (i.e. entities operated by municipalities) will be 
taken over by the state, because the funds for the financing 
of these institutions will no longer be provided. As a result, 
there will be less room for re-allocation of some of these 
funds for the purpose of the payment of the instalments 
that fall due.
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the banking system has booked losses, mostly due to 
one-off effects; adjusting for those, the sector is 
profitable. At the end of December 2011, the banking 
sector reported a pre-tax loss of HUF 212 billion, a 
significant deterioration from the pre-tax profit of HUF 50 
billion in the previous year (Chart 79). After adjusting the 
2011 loss for the bank levy and the loss attributable to the 
early repayment scheme, estimated to be HUF 330 billion by 
the MNB, the profit before taxes would be approximately 
HUF 110 billion at the end of the year.
the profitability indicators adjusted for one-off effects 
place the banking sector in the lower third of the region. 
The year-end figures also pushed profitability indicators into 
the negative range. The 12-month rolling ROA for the banking 
sector was -0.7 percent while its ROE was -8.1 percent. 
Adjusting for the bank levy and the impact of the early 
repayment scheme, the ROA would be 0.4 percent and the 
ROE 4.2 percent, it is quite favourable but still considerably 
below the pre-crisis levels. The adjusted profitability 
indicators are also low in an international comparison (Chart 
80).
net interest income consistently provides most of the 
income. Interest income is the largest and also the most 
stable source of income for banks. Its amount and its ratio 
to total assets remained practically unchanged in the past 
year. The volume of net fees and commissions declined 
slightly while their share remained stable. Trading income 
increased substantially over the level of the previous year, 
which is attributable to the income from and revaluation of 
other derivative transactions. Dividend income, mostly 
2.5. even though one-off effects have caused 
the banking sector to record losses, high 
interest margins make its earning potential 
competitive over the medium term
The banking sector booked losses in 2011 due to losses on the early repayment scheme. Adjusting for the bank levy and 
the impact of the early repayment scheme, however, the banking sector would have been profitable, although the adjusted 
profitability indicators are rather low in an international comparison. There is a particularly striking asymmetry in 
profitability, as the overwhelming majority of both positive and negative earnings are attributable to a few major banks. 
From a 2-3 year perspective, the profitability of the banking sector may be compromised by the decrease of best-
performing customers under the early repayment scheme, while the decrease of the bank levy, the absence of one-off 
profitability shocks and lower risk costs may have a positive impact. Sector-level capital adequacy is high, albeit 
asymmetrical: at year-end, two thirds of the regulatory capital buffer was held by three banks, reflecting the vulnerability 
of individual banks. Parent banks are committed to preserve the capital positions of their subsidiaries in Hungary, as 
evidenced by the substantial capital injections at the end of the last year. Still, there is a growing risk that capital 
injections are later followed by deleveraging.
chart 79
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originating abroad, played an important role in maintaining 
the level of income. On the expenditure side, the level of 
operating costs decreased slightly, by close to four percent, 
while their share within the components of profits remained 
effectively unchanged. By contrast, there was a significant 
increase in provisioning: its ratio to total assets has 
increased as the provisioning requirement on loans to 
corporations and to households (including the provisioning 
requirement due to the early repayment scheme) was 
outstandingly high (Chart 81). The bank levy had significantly 
smaller effect than in the previous year, as 30 percent of 
the losses suffered due to the early repayment scheme can 
now be offset against the levy; thus the cost recorded in 
this respect declined substantially. The other losses was 
caused mostly by write-offs of goodwill.
interest margin is high in international comparison. The 
positive profitability of the banking sector, after adjustment 
for government measures, is attributable for the most part 
to the interest margin. Its level is in the high range in an 
international comparison (Chart 82). The pass-through of 
risk costs to performing customers and the weakening of 
the forint also had a positive impact on net interest income 
and, consequently, on interest margins. The high interest 
margin can be considered as a market failure. The regulator 
eliminated all obstacles to refinancing loans; in addition, 
transparent pricing stimulates stronger competition on the 
market. Since it would be disadvantageous for banks due to 
the decreasing margin, there will not be a considerable 
refinancing activity from the supply side.
nevertheless, there is very high asymmetry in profitability 
within the banking sector. The number of loss-making 
banks dropped from 21 in December 2010 to 19 at end-2011; 
however, the market share by total assets of banks in the 
red increased from 35 percent to 43 percent in one year as 
more large banks drifted into this category. The unadjusted 
pre-tax loss of HUF 212 billion results from a profit of HUF 
260 billion and a loss of HUF 472 billion. Close to three 
fourths of the total profit was achieved by three banks. 
Banks’ losses were also highly concentrated, with the three 
banks with the highest losses being responsible for 70 
percent of the gross losses of the banking sector. Large 
banks dominate among banks posting either profit or loss, 
while the majority of the other banks booked a pre-tax 
profit/loss of around zero (Chart 83). The six foreign-owned 
banks that dominate corporate and household lending 
produced an aggregate loss of HUF 363 billion, compared to 
almost HUF 100 billion in 2010.
we expect the profits of the banking sector to remain 
low in 2012 and the profitability potential to improve 
over the medium term. The banks may no longer count on 
chart 81
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the margin that they had achieved with the previously 
healthy portfolio, which is now disappearing under the early 
repayment scheme. Even though we expect lower 
provisioning requirements because of the exchange rate 
cap, our calculations show a higher revenue shortfall due to 
the approximately 1 percent interest foregone by the banks 
under the exchange rate cap regime at the current level of 
the exchange rate. Our forecast suggests that in the next 
two years, the loan portfolios will continue to shrink, which 
may cut into the return on equity. Some of the losses from 
the early repayment scheme will also reduce the year 2012 
profits. Nevertheless, following the decrease of the bank 
levy and the absence of one-off profitability shocks, in the 
longer term the banking sector should have a strong 
potential for profitability.
to offset losses, foreign parent banks have raised capital 
in several major banks. The capital adequacy ratio of the 
banking sector was close to 13.5 percent at the end of last 
year. Until August, the CAR of the banking sector increased 
due to the shrinking outstanding loan portfolio and the 
growth of available capital. In September, however, the 
capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector fell to 12.7 
percent (Chart 84), predominantly due to the surge in 
losses. To address losses resulting from the early repayment 
scheme and the high provisioning requirement, foreign 
parent banks implemented capital increases at their 
subsidiaries in the aggregate amount of approximately HUF 
350 billion (Chart 85). Even though parent banks are 
committed to consolidating the capital positions of their 
subsidiaries in Hungary, there is a growing risk that capital 
will later be followed by deleveraging. The fact that banks 
foresaw a significant drop in their risk-weighted asset 
values in the Market Intelligence Survey may foreshadow 
such a development (Box 9).
the distribution of capital buffers is concentrated. At the 
end of the year, the market share by total assets of banks 
with a capital adequacy ratio of less than eight percent was 
close to 10 percent (Chart 86). The owners of these banks 
increased capital early in 2012. At year-end, two thirds of 
the HUF 968 billion regulatory capital buffer was held by 
three banks, which shows the vulnerability of individual 
banks (Chart 87).
in the financial enterprises sector, enterprises owned by 
banks suffered material losses. At the end of 2011, the 
entire sector of financial enterprises realised pre-tax 
losses of HUF 57 billion of which HUF 49 billion was 
recorded by bank-owned financial enterprises (Chart 88). 
Bank-owned financial enterprises restrained their activities 
considerably. As a result − together with deteriorating 
portfolio quality − they have booked continually worsening 
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losses for the past three years, forcing owners to repeatedly 
raise capital.
the income of the savings cooperatives sector continued 
to fall, and their capital accumulation capacity is 
weakening. The pre-tax profit of savings cooperatives 
dropped further from the base of 2011, mainly due to 
declining trading (Chart 89). Because the share of corporate 
and household loans is low and the presence of foreign 
currency denominated loans is minimal, loan loss provisioning 
is also lower. Consequently, they were less affected by the 
early repayment scheme. The majority of cooperative 
credit institutions have an adjusted balance sheet total 
below HUF 50 billion, and thus they were subject to a lower 
bank levy rate.
at the sector level, sufficient capital adequacy conceals 
asymmetries. At the end of 2011, cooperative credit 
institutions had a capital adequacy ratio of 14.7 percent, 
showing a strong capital position, but significant asymmetry 
can be observed. Additional risks pertaining to the sector 
are shown by the SREP CAR indicator of 11.6 percent at end-
2011.
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Within the context of the Market Intelligence Survey, using questionnaires and meetings with senior management, early in 2012 the 
MNB approached the eight largest Hungarian commercial banks and two branches of foreign banks active on the money markets to 
obtain information about banks’ expectations for 2012. Against the backdrop of a high degree of uncertainty, their objectives include 
intensifying deposit collection, strengthening profitability and efficiency positions, and increasing self-financing capabilities. 
box 9
business expectations of Hungarian banks for 2012
banks’ target figures for the financial year of 2012
indicators
surveyed banks banking sector
end of 2011 
values
plans for 2012
end of 2011 
values
plans for 2012
i. balance sheet developments
1. Increase of balance sheet total (YoY) 2.3% −3.6% 2.8% −3.0%
2. Credit growth targets
    a. Households −12.0% −8.4% −10.3% −5.9%
    b. Non-financial corporations −7.3% −3.2% −5.2% −3.6%
    c. Financial corporations −22.6% −9.6% −22.0% −3.4%
3. Growth targets for deposit taking
    a. Households 3.3% 4.5% 4.5% 3.6%
    b. Non-financial corporations −0.3% 0.3% −0.3% 1.3%
    c. Financial corporations 10.8% −0.6% 11.9% −1.6%
ii. liquidity, asset-liability matching
1. Loan-to-deposit ratio (change in percentage point)
−7,8 percentage 
point
−15 percentage 
point
−20 percentage 
point
−4 percentage 
point
2. Foreign funding/balance sheet total (percent) 24.8% 20.7% 26.2% 24.6%
3. On balance sheet open FX position (percent) 16.0% 11.8% 13.6%
not enough 
reponses for 
drawing 
conclusion
iii. portfolio quality
1. Non-performing loans' ratio (percent)
    a. Households 12.5% 15.6% 13.1%
    b. Non financial corporations 17.7% 19.3% 17.4%
    c. Total loans 13.5% 16.0% 13.3%
2. Loan loss provisiong (as percent of total loans)
    a. Households 5.3% 4.6% 5.6%
    b. Non financial corporations 3.7% 2.1% 4.2%
    c. Total loans 2.6% n. a. 2.7%
iii. profitability
Profit before tax (HUF billion) −66 67 −212
ROA (%) (before tax) −0.3% 0.4% −0.7%
ROE (%) (before tax) −3.2% 0.5% −8.1%
iv. capital position
Growth in Risk Weighted Assets total −1.0% −4.5% −0.7%
Capital adequacy ratio 13.3% 14.5% 13.5%
vi. other goals
Number of employees 24 688 23 844 30 738
Branches (number) 1 362 1 318 1 691
Note: Individual banks’ target figures based on balance-sheet totals and weighted for share in the particular business segment. Facts and 
projected data as of the year-end. The projected bank sector average is an arithmetic average.
Source: MNB’s Market Intelligence survey.
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In 2012, banks are planning substantial balance sheet contraction, potentially resulting in a drop in the loan-to-deposit ratio. Underlying 
factors include the contraction of corporate and household loans and an expansion of deposits at a rate similar to the one projected 
by the MNB. Competition may be intensified in the deposits market as banks are targeting greater deposit growth than forecasts for 
the entire sector would support. As evidenced by their budgeted figures, the foreign funding of banks will decrease; banks intend to 
achieve this through other means than expanding their currency swap stock. If banks pursue the course outlined in 2012, the speed of 
outflow of external funds and vulnerability in the currency swap market will both be reduced.
Banks expect the ratio of loans overdue more than 90 days to increase for both household loans and loans to non-financial corporations. 
In the household segment, institutions expect a greater rise in the non-performing portfolio than the MNB forecast. The growth of the 
non-performing ratio is attributable partly to the better performing customers lost through the early repayment scheme and partly to 
the fact that banks do not expect the new arrangements aiming to help borrowers in foreign currency to significantly reduce the non-
performing portfolio. In the corporate portfolio, banks envisage a more modest increase in the NPL ratio; thus they projected a lower 
rate than the MNB. In 2012, the banking sector may return to profitability.
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2.6.1  capital inJections by paRent 
banKs Have incReaseD tHe 
Resilience of tHe banKing sectoR
the macroeconomic baseline scenario is less favourable 
than in the autumn 2011 report. The current baseline 
scenario is identical to the forecast in the March issue of 
the Quarterly Report on Inflation. This scenario points to a 
less favourable outlook for 2012 than the one applied in the 
November Report on Financial Stability. The deteriorating 
global economic outlook and surrounding risks − and, in 
connection with that, the slowdown in the domestic 
economy − has contributed to the worse baseline scenario. 
Expected growth is lower (Chart 90), while the forint has 
depreciated against both the euro and the Swiss franc. In 
the baseline scenario, employment (Chart 91) increase only 
by substantial expansion of public work programmes, 
though this tends not to improve the labour market 
prospects of performing borrowers.
escalation of the european sovereign debt crisis and the 
consequences of the related global economic downturn 
are quantified in the stress scenario. While the baseline 
scenario represents the most likely course of events, the 
stress scenario examines the consequences of a low-
probability, severe but plausible series of events. We 
assume that the problems of the European sovereign debt 
crisis will escalate again and, as a result, the euro area will 
fall into a recession deeper than previously envisaged. 
Declining external demand will curb Hungarian exports and 
2.6  stress tests underline strong  
shock-absorbing capacity
Over the next two years, the Hungarian banking system will have to operate in a subdued growth environment, with a 
weaker HUF/EUR exchange rate level than previously envisaged. However, the capital injections by parent banks at the 
end of last year and the beginning of this year consolidated the capital position of the banking sector and thus, on the 
whole, its resilience has increased. Nevertheless, one of the banks needs to raise additional capital even in the baseline 
scenario. According to our stress test, in the event of a persistent two-year shock, additional capital of HUF 83 billion 
would be required for the banking system as a whole to meet the 8 percent minimum capital requirement. In the stress 
scenario, three-quarters of the requirement is linked to a single bank. This capital need is significantly lower and much 
more concentrated than the previous stress test result published in autumn 2011 (for a period of one and a half years), as 
a result of the sizeable capital injections.
The banks are meeting the liquidity requirements imposed in January 2012. In the event of a low probability complex 
stress, which simulates simultaneous occurrence of financial market turmoil, deposit withdrawal and exchange rate shock, 
the aggregate liquidity buffer remains positive but its level falls below the regulatory requirement. In this event, meeting 
the balance-sheet coverage ratio of 10 percent of total assets would require additional liquidity equivalent to 4 percentage 
point of total assets, while FX liquidity need would amount to EUR 3.4 billion.
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the costs of external financing will rise. Hungarian risk 
premia will increase considerably and the exchange rate of 
the forint will depreciate notably. In this scenario, monetary 
policy will start a tightening cycle, attempting to forestall 
both financial stability risks and inflationary effects of the 
exchange rate depreciation. The persistently high risk 
premium will make borrowing more difficult for companies, 
which in turn will curb economic growth. Thus, in the stress 
scenario, the economy will slide into a severe, protracted 
recession in 2012, with recovery starting only in Q4 2013 
(Table 6). As a result of more severe risks and worsening 
growth prospects, companies will cut employment, 
undermining the income position of households. Considering 
the commitment of the Swiss National Bank to the exchange 
rate of the Swiss franc, we expect an exchange rate of EUR/
CHF 1.2 over the entire horizon.
several assumptions were made for the quantification of 
the effects of government programmes aimed at 
managing the difficulties of foreign currency borrowers. 
Our calculations are based on the preliminary balance sheet 
and profit and loss account figures of banks for end-
December 2011, adjusted by the effects of early repayment 
in January and February 2012. Thus, the entire effect of 
early repayment is reflected in the lower loans outstanding, 
capital requirements and capital levels. The new exchange 
rate cap is taken into account at several points (Table 7). As 
the programme will also result in a lower net present value 
of instalments, participation is worthwhile for every eligible 
borrower. We estimate that 90 percent of the performing 
loans outstanding satisfy the eligibility criteria for the 
programme; thus these borrowers are taken into account in 
the expected loan losses as of H2 2012 with the lower debt 
servicing burden. The lower instalment is the result of the 
burden-sharing between the banks, the state and borrowers. 
The resulting costs are deducted from the profits of banks. 
We assume that 20 percent of the non-performing mortgage 
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table 6
Macroeconomic scenarios in the stress test
baseline scenario stress scenario
2012 2013 2012 2013
GDP* 0.1 1.5 −1.1 −0.7
Sovereign CDS spread (bp) 546 475 743 811
Yearly average of HUF/EUR exchange rate 297 331
Yearly average of HUF/CHF exchange rate 247 276
Employment* − public sector −2.0 −0.2 −2.0 −0.2
Employment* − private sector −0.1 0.5 −1.0 −2.0
House prices* 0.0 0.0 −10.0 −10.0
* yoy percentage change.
Source: MNB.
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table 7
assumptions on schemes targeting foreign currency 
denominated mortgage loans of households 
(per cent)
Ratio of borrowers opting for the new exchange 
rate cap 90
Ratio of non-performing FX mortgage loans eligible 
for conversion into HUF 20
Rate of debt cancellation on loans converted into 
HUF 25
The relief on bank levy for debt cancellation 30
Rate of converted loans regaining performing status 50
Source: MNB.
loans may be eligible for conversion into forints and partial 
debt relief. We reckoned on the debt cancellation of 25 
percent in these cases, 30 percent of which have been 
deducted from the bank levy. We assumed the HUF/CHF 
exchange rate to be 247 for both the baseline and stress 
scenarios; that is, in the stress scenario, forint conversion 
would occur before the exchange rate shock. We assume 
that 50 percent of the portfolio converted into forint loans 
would regain performing status, and the other half would 
redefault.
both in the baseline and the stress scenario, a decline in 
earnings before loan losses of individual institutions 
(adjusted for the impact of the early repayment) is 
assumed. In order to determine profitability, operating 
profit was taken as a basis. Added to this were exceptional 
impairment, loan loss provisioning, bank levy and losses on 
early repayment. Profitability in the baseline scenario was 
forecasted on the basis of the empirical relation between 
adjusted income calculated as described above, as well as 
performing loans and certain financial variables (e.g. short 
and long forint yields, 3-month EURIBOR, Hungarian 5-year 
CDS spread), while in the stress scenario 90 per cent of that 
figure was used. The forecasts were modified in certain 
respects on the basis of additional information received. 
Earnings before loan losses will be worsened in the 
forthcoming years by the significant contraction of the 
household portfolio due to the early repayment scheme. 
Furthermore this lost portfolio was decidedly well-
performing and highly profitable. Consequently, income 
before loan losses will decline even in the baseline scenario, 
falling to 89 percent and 85 percent of the prior period 
(2007−2011) in 2012 and 2013, respectively, for the entire 
banking sector. In the stress scenario, the corresponding 
ratios are 80 and 77 per cent.
loan losses were taken into account not only for 
corporate and household loans, but also for local 
government portfolio. The probability of default (PD) and 
loss given default (LGD) of corporate and household 
portfolio elements in the macroeconomic scenarios were 
estimated with the methodologies used for our previous 
reports. We used these figures to establish the expected 
loan loss rates on the two respective portfolios (Chart 92 
and Chart 93). For corporate loans; we expect higher loan 
losses in the stress scenario than in 2009−2010, the worst 
crisis years. However, losses are lower than in 2011. We 
consider the 2011 loss to be an outlier. In that year banks 
significantly increased the loan loss coverage of non-
performing loans. Loan loss provisioning for local government 
exposures was quantified again because, after a grace 
period, the first principal payments on a substantial part of 
the bonds will become due. Based on expert judgement we 
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calculated loan loss provisioning on loans and bonds (an 
annual 0.5-0.8 percent in the baseline and 1.2-1.4 percent 
in the stress scenario, depending on the product).
even though the loan loss coverage on non-performing 
loans increased substantially in 2011, additional 
provisioning may be required in the event of a stress. 
Similarly to our earlier stress test, an additional loss on non-
performing loans was calculated again in the stress scenario. 
Additional substantial losses may be incurred on these loans 
as a result of the deteriorating macroeconomic environment 
(due to the drop in real estate prices and the depreciation 
of the forint); therefore, they aggravate the vulnerability of 
the banking sector both in terms of profitability and 
funding.
Due to the deterioration of the economic environment, 
we continue to expect significant loan losses. The weaker 
growth prospects attributable to the euro area sovereign 
debt crisis and the weaker HUF exchange rate both add to 
the expected loan losses. In the case of the household 
portfolio, the introduction of the exchange rate cap has a 
slight mitigating effect but its impacts will not be perceivable 
before the second half of 2012. Accordingly, for 2012 we 
expect high loan losses in line with the Report on Stability 
published in November, while for 2013 a slight decrease is 
expected. In the stress scenario, due to the persistent and 
significant worsening of the macroeconomic environment, 
the losses in 2012 would be 39 per cent higher than in the 
baseline, without any in 2013; thus the stress scenario 
would yield close to 56 per cent higher losses (Table 8).
in the stress scenario, a rise in government bond yields 
would have a significant negative effect on profitability. 
In the market risk stress test we look at the impact of 
table 8
Main components of the losses of the banking sector in the stress test over a two-year horizon
Main components of losses of banking system in eight quarter 
horizon (HUf bn)
baseline scenario stress scenario
2012 2013 2012 2013
loan losses on corporate and household portfolio 327 276 538 526
Loan losses on new non-performing corporate loans 165 151 235 229
Loan losses on new non-performing household loans 162 126 234 233
Additional loan losses on the already non-performing loans 68 65
Loan losses on local government portfolio 6 6 13 12
Exchange rate risk of open position −28 −28
Interest rate risk 43 43
Bank levy 113 61 113 61
Interest cost of the exchange rate cap scheme 14 26 18 41
Source: MNB.
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interest and exchange rate shocks through the immediate 
revaluation of market exposures. The average exchange 
rate and interest rate difference between the baseline and 
stress scenarios was taken into account market risk stress 
test as well. The resulting profit impact was evenly 
distributed over the two-year horizon. An approximately 
300 basis point parallel upward shift of the yield curve 
results in an almost HUF 80 billion loss at the banking sector 
level, mainly due to the revaluation of the government 
securities portfolio (Chart 94).
the impact of the exchange rate shock is positive, but 
smaller in comparison with the previous market risk 
stress test. On aggregate, the banking sector is holding an 
open position against the forint; therefore, the depreciation 
of the exchange rate has a positive effect on profitability. 
In the stress scenario, the exchange rate would depreciate 
by 12 percent on average, which ceteris paribus would 
increase the profits of banks with long FX positions, i.e. the 
majority of banking sector, by approximately HUF 53 billion 
and reduce the profits of banks with forint surpluses by HUF 
2 billion in aggregate through the total open FX position 
(Chart 94).
in the baseline scenario, due to the material capital 
injections by parent banks in 2011−2012, the banks will 
meet the 8 percent capital requirement by end-2013 
except one. At the end of 2011 and early this year, several 
Hungarian banks received capital injections from their 
parents to absorb the losses resulting from the deteriorating 
economic environment and the early repayment scheme. 
The new capital allowed banks to weather outstanding 
losses in 2011, with adequate capital levels and to be able 
to absorb further losses. One bank, however, will need 
significant additional capital, amounting to HUF 12 billion, 
even in the baseline scenario (Table 9). The other banks will 
have capital adequacy ratios above 9 percent and the 
capital buffer of the banking sector will increase over the 
forecast horizon.
as a result of the capital injections, the shock-absorbing 
capacity of banks has improved, and thus the additional 
capital requirement in the stress scenario is lower but 
more concentrated than in the november report. The 
better capital position is also reflected in the stress 
scenario. In 2012, under the stress scenario, HUF 27 billion 
capital would need to be raised for a single bank so that 
each bank meets the 8 percent requirement. The 9 percent 
level would require HUF 51 billion capital injection for two 
banks (Table 10). As a result of a persistent stress, in 2013 
banks would need significantly greater amounts of capital 
injections, but the capital need of HUF 83 billion to meet 
the 8 percent minimum CAR is still significantly below the 
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table 9
stress test results based on 8 percent regulatory capital 
requirement
baseline 
scenario
stress scenario
2012 2013 2012 2013
Capital need of banks 
(HUF Bn) 0 12 27 83
Capital buffer of banks 
above 8 percent CAR 
(HUF Bn) 1,117 1,294 803 691
total capital buffer 
(HUf bn) 1,117 1,282 776 608
Source: MNB.
table 10
stress test results based on 9 percent regulatory capital 
requirement
baseline 
scenario
stress scenario
2012 2013 2012 2013
Capital need of banks 
(HUF Bn) 12 29 51 153
Capital buffer of banks 
above 9 percent CAR 
(HUF Bn) 960 1,143 642 583
total capital buffer 
(HUf bn) 948 1,114 591 430
Source: MNB.
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level envisaged in our autumn report. Furthermore effects 
of the shock would ebb away considerably the capital buffer 
of the banking sector, which would worsen the lending 
capacity. Despite the significant contraction, capital buffer 
will be higher in the recent stress test than in the results 
half year ago, even though shorter forecast horizon was 
covered that time. Still, it should be emphasised that the 
commitment of parent banks to their Hungarian subsidiaries 
is critical because of the expected capital needs and to 
boost lending.
although systemic capital adequacy seems to be 
adequate, the aggregate indicator conceals significant 
asymmetry. The capital adequacy ratio of the banking 
sector is robust, reaching 15.6 percent by end-2013 in the 
baseline scenario and approaching 11 percent in the stress 
scenario following a two-year shock (Chart 95). This 
seemingly favourable figure conceals very high asymmetry; 
capital adequacy ratios of individual institutions are widely 
dispersed. Furthermore, poor performers include several 
major institutions including one with additional capital 
need even in the baseline scenario (Chart 96).
2.6.2  tHe liQUiDity stRess test 
inDicates a consiDeRable sHoRtage 
of foReign cURRency
the short-term liquidity of the seven large banks is 
adequate. Two new indicators were introduced in January 
2012 to ensure short-term liquidity of banks (Box 10). Banks 
have been complying with these requirements continuously, 
but there is an asymmetry in the case of the liquidity 
surplus in excess of the mandatory liquidity requirement. 
Some banks maintain their ratios close to the regulatory 
minimum liquidity requirement, while others have 
considerably higher surplus, and thus the free liquidity 
reserve is concentrated in a few banks.
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The 2008 crisis highlighted that the drying up of both interbank and swap markets can cause severe liquidity tensions in the banking 
system. In order to prevent such situations, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority and the Magyar Nemzeti Bank initiated the 
introduction of two short-term liquidity indicators supervised daily and one long-term indicator regulating the maturity mismatch in 
foreign exchange positions. The relevant regulation was promulgated at the end of December 2011.
 The daily indicators aim to assure that banks have sufficient liquidity buffers in proportion to their balance sheet total or deposit 
portfolio on a 30-day horizon. The liquidity surplus of banks is the sum of the cumulative surplus or deficit resulting as the difference 
of present and future assets and liabilities relating to treasury transactions and the available liquid reserves.
box 10
new elements in the Hungarian liquidity regulations 
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Credit institutions must determine their liquidity surplus in proportion to the prevailing daily balance sheet total (balance sheet 
coverage ratio) and also to the stock of corporate and household deposits (deposit coverage ratio). The minimum level of the balance 
sheet coverage ratio is 10 percent; the required level of the deposit coverage ratio is 20 percent. Credit institutions must meet at least 
one of these two minimum levels. The seven large banks comply with the minimum liquidity levels set out in the government decree. 
However, a number of banks have liquidity surpluses as a percentage of the balance sheet total close to the regulatory limit. Most of 
the other banks meet both indicators, some can meet only one of the requirements but there is no market participant that fails to 
comply with either.
 In addition to short term liquidity risks, the Hungarian banking system also faces a significant risk in the medium term: that is the 
maturity mismatch in foreign exchange positions. To manage this risk, the MNB proposed the foreign exchange funding adequacy ratio 
(FFAR), which is the quotient of stable foreign exchange funds plus the net foreign exchange swap stock with a maturity over one year 
divided by the weighted foreign currency denominated assets to be financed (the method of calculation of the ratio is explained in 
details in the Report on Financial Stability of November 2011). As of 1 July 2012, banks will have to comply not only with the daily 
liquidity indicators but also with the 65 percent minimum for the FFAR. The most recent available data indicate that an overwhelming 
majority of large banks meet the regulatory requirement. 
Previously there was no quantified liquidity or maturity mismatch 
requirement for the Hungarian banking system; the new rules 
amend this situation. Recently, the problem of daily liquidity and 
maturity mismatch has become the focus of international 
regulation as well. The primary objective of the LCR (Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio) to be implemented as of 2015 is to assure that in 
a stress situation banks have an adequate amount of liquidity up 
to 30 days to meet their obligations, while the Hungarian 
regulation requires banks to maintain adequate liquidity under 
normal business conditions, but making conservative assumptions. 
The maturity mismatch will be regulated by the NSFR indicator 
proposed to be introduced in 2018, which, in contrast with the 
FFAR, expects the matching of maturities irrespective of 
denomination.
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low probability complex stress test: simultaneous 
occurrence of financial market turmoil, deposit 
withdrawal and exchange rate shock. In addition to forint 
depreciation, we determined household and corporate 
deposit withdrawals as well as the price decline of central 
bank eligible securities using the data of the seven largest 
banks, applying value-at-risk (VaR) based stresses relying on 
historical data. The size of the exchange rate shock is 
identical to the one applied in the macro stress scenario, 
whereas mainly empirical crisis experiences were used in 
determining the other parameters (Table 11).
the entire liquidity buffer remained positive under the 
complex stress scenario, but the regulatory liquidity 
surplus declined substantially while a considerable 
foreign currency shortage emerged. Even in the complex 
stress scenario, each banks’ liquidity would be positive 
while the total assets proportionate regulatory surplus 
would fall almost 4 percent below the 10 percent 
requirement (Chart 97). In the event of turmoil on the swap 
markets − which play a key role in the foreign exchange 
refinancing of the domestic banking sector − foreign 
currency may become hard to obtain. In an extreme case, 
exchangeability between currencies may not be possible. 
Under stress, a foreign currency liquidity requirement of an 
amount below the forint surplus, corresponding to 4 
percent of total assets amounting to EUR 3.4 billion, may 
arise.
table 11
Main parameters of the liquidity stress test
assets liabilities
item Degree (percent) currencies affected item Degree (percent) currencies affected
Default on interbank 
assets
20 HUF
Withdrawals in 
household deposits
10 HUF/FX
Exchange rate shock 
on swaps
15 FX
Withdrawals in 
corporate deposits
15 HUF/FX
Depreciation of 
assets eligible at the 
central bank
10 HUF
Note: The forward-looking treasury gap assumes no active treasury management on the part of the bank; thus it does not take into account the 
potential rollovers of maturing interbank and foreign funds.
Source: MNB.
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liquidity buffer after a stress and foreign exchange liquidity 
shortage (only shortage) as a percentage of the balance-
sheet total
254 274 294 316 338
HUF/EUR exchange rate
Per cent
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Per cent
Liquidity buffer in balance-sheet total
Liquidity shortage (only shortage) in balance-sheet total
Stress scenario with 
15 per cent depreciation 
of the exchange rate
Note: Based on 31 January 2012 data.
Source: MNB.
REPORT ON FINANCIAL STABILITY • APRIL 2012 77
the assets managed by investments funds fell 
substantially, due to the changes in the pension system. 
Overall, the assets managed by investment funds were 
reduced by HUF 260 billion in 2011. The decline was most 
marked in July (Chart 98), when the government started the 
redemption of the assets managed in private pension funds. 
Capital was continuously withdrawn from the sector 
throughout the year and the adverse economic climate 
forced private investors to redeem their savings as well. 
The decline in Q4 may be partly attributable to the need to 
raise funds for the early repayment of foreign currency 
denominated mortgage loans. The major drop in the assets 
managed may trigger restructuring in the market of 
investment funds, those funds that had the management of 
private pension fund assets as their dominant activity are 
the most vulnerable.
Redirection of all of the private pension fund contributions 
into the state pillar practically means the abolition of the 
private pension fund system. With the change of the 
pension fund system, the assets of private pension funds 
plummeted by 92 percent in one year by the end of 2011 
(Chart 99). The dominance of the pay-as-you-go pillar in the 
pension insurance field has been restored in full: from 2012 
on, all of the individual pension contributions will be paid 
into the state pillar, and participants can maintain their 
membership in private pension funds only if they make 
voluntary payments into the funds. Thus private pension 
funds have no revenues to cover their operating costs. 
Therefore, the operation of pension funds cannot be 
maintained in the long term. The consolidation of pension 
funds has already started; two of them have announced 
their termination and more closures and mergers are 
expected in the near future.
the assets of voluntary pension funds have not shown 
any noticeable change. With the disappearance of the 
2.7  both the abolition of the mandatory 
private pension fund system and the early 
repayment scheme deplete the assets 
managed by Hungarian investment funds 
The redirection of all private pension contributions into the state pillar has practically abolished mandatory private 
pension funds. Even though the overhaul of the private pension fund system heightened the importance of private pension 
savings, this is not yet noticeable in the assets of voluntary pension funds. The capital withdrawal of former private 
pension funds has significantly reduced the volume of assets managed by investment funds, and their income dropped 
accordingly. In line with European developments, the negative growth prospects are likely to reduce demand for insurance 
products in both the life and non-life business. 
chart 98
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private pension fund pillar, private pension savings have 
become even more important. Nevertheless, the popularity 
of voluntary funds has been declining for years. Though 
increasing numbers of new members have been joining, this 
is offset by the growth in the number of exists, which is 
explained by the crisis and the related adverse economic 
situation. Furthermore, the lowering of the tax deduction 
on voluntary pension fund contributions has also undermined 
the appeal of such funds. The changes in the cafeteria 
system have also had a detrimental effect on voluntary 
pension funds as employees tend to prefer consumption-
related options.
the profitability of the Hungarian insurance sector 
increased slightly in 2011 (chart 100). The profit of the 
life business was significantly below the previous year level, 
which is attributable to the increase in indemnity payments. 
By contrast, the profits of the non-life business improved 
because of lowering expenditures explained by the absence 
of flood and storm damage. In addition, the non-life 
business also contracted because both the third party 
liability and the comprehensive insurance products 
generated less revenue. The average premia have been 
declining in this segment, due to the continuously strong 
competition. (Chart 101).
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availability of operation of the vibeR was above the 
expected level in 2011. The average availability ratio was 
99.96 percent in 2011 (Chart 102). In 2012, the methodology 
for monitoring the availability of VIBER was changed, 
consisting primarily in the expansion of the tools of 
oversight to monitor any operational risk events in the 
VIBER. Thus, monitoring of VIBER has been expanded from 
settling payment transactions and VIBER monitor service to 
all business functions.
last year, intraday liquidity was abundant in vibeR. In 
2011, the turnover of vIBER exceeded the average of the 
previous year but characterised with more fluctuations. 
Analysis of the liquidity risk indicates that the credit 
institutions in the system continued to maintain high credit 
lines; as a result, the level of intraday liquidity remains 
ample both at the aggregate and individual levels.
liquidity in vibeR was also promoted by the optional 
reserve requirement ratio regime introduced in 
november 2010. Several of the 5 VIBER members with the 
largest debit turnover, have made use the opportunity to 
flexibly change the reserve requirement ratio (Chart 103). 
Credit institutions with high turnovers in VIBER tended to 
increase their reserve ratio above 2 percent. The potential 
collateral available in the individual banks’ balance sheets 
and not yet pledged for central bank credit operations 
alleviates the liquidity risk of the system.
in vibeR, the “payment versus payment” method has 
been introduced for executing linked payments and 
operating hours have been extended by one hour. Since 
12th December 2011, the “payment versus payment” 
method offers an opportunity for settling large offsetting 
customer transactions with substantial intraday liquidity 
saving and without increasing intraday counterparty 
exposures at the Hungarian VIBER participants toward their 
customers. As part of the preparation for the intraday ICS 
clearing to be launched on 1st July 2012, the operating 
hours of VIBER were extended by one hour as of January 
2012.
2.8  Hungarian payment and settlement 
systems have operated at a low risk level
The operation of Hungarian payment and settlement systems continued to be stable in 2011, with adequate liquidity and 
system availability. The monitoring of availability of the VIBER has been expanded from settling payment transactions and 
VIBER monitor service to all business functions. The ICS and the VIBER as the settlement platform of the ICS, together with 
the sector of credit institutions, continued the preparation for the ICS intraday clearing to be implemented on 1 July 2012.
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liquidity in the interbank clearing system (ics) was also 
abundant in 2011. The ratio of unfunded queuing 
transactions to turnover remains insignificant. The liquidity 
in the ICS was abundant (Chart 104) as the ICS and vIBER 
use practically the same liquidity pool for settlement, while 
the turnover of the ICS is less than 5 percent of the turnover 
of vIBER. Consequently, any queuing can be considered as 
a result of the inadequate collateral management procedures 
of clearing members as members would have been able to 
fill in the liquidity gap from the eligible, but not yet pledged 
collateral available in their balance sheets.
intraday clearing of electronically submitted credit 
transfers in ics will be introduced on 1st July 2012. The 
introduction of intraday clearing is required by the MNB 
decree on execution of payment transactions, thus after 
July 2012, domestic electronic credit transfers shall take no 
longer than 4 hours to arrive at the recipient credit 
institution.
the intraday ics clearing regime will force some credit 
institutions to slightly adjust their intraday transaction 
and liquidity management. VIBER will be the settlement 
platform for the ICS in the case of intraday clearing as well. 
The settlement for intraday clearing will be time critical in 
VIBER as depending on the clearing cycle, clearing members 
have 15 or 60 minutes to provide sufficient liquidity. 
However, the available current account balance and intraday 
credit lines not yet utilised may also serve as liquidity for 
the settlement. Furthermore, in VIBER, ICS settlements will 
have the second highest priority after MNB initiated 
transactions. Consequently, some credit institutions may 
have to adjust their intraday transaction and liquidity 
management. This is because there are days when some 
credit institutions experience high maximum intraday credit 
line utilisation in VIBER.
availability of the securities settlement system was 
sufficient. In 2011, the settlement rates for the markets 
guaranteed by KELER KSZF deteriorated as compared to the 
previous year. Close to 85 percent of settlement fails 
related to two clearing members, and half of the settlement 
fails extended beyond the day (Chart 105).
chart 104
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appendix: Macro-prudential indicators
1  RisK appetite
chart 1
primary risk indicators
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chart 3
Dresdner Kleinwort indicator
Ja
n.
 0
5
M
ay
 0
5
O
ct
. 
05
M
ar
. 
06
A
ug
. 
06
Ja
n.
 0
7
Ju
ne
 0
7
O
ct
. 
07
M
ar
. 
08
A
ug
. 
08
Ja
n.
 0
9
Ju
ne
 0
9
N
ov
. 
09
M
ar
. 
10
A
ug
. 
10
Ja
n.
 1
1
Ju
ne
 1
1
N
ov
. 
11
A
pr
. 
12
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
ARPI2
ARPI2 (trend)
Source: DrKW.
chart 2
implied volatility of the primary markets
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2  eXteRnal balance anD vUlneRability
chart 4
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chart 5
external financing requirement and its financing as
percentage of gDp
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chart 7
open fX position of the main sectors as percentage of gDp
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3  MacRoeconoMic peRfoRMance
chart 8
gDp growth and its main components 
(annual growth rate)
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chart 10
Use of household income as a ratio of disposable income
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chart 9
employment rate and net wage developments 
(annual growth rate)
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chart 11
corporate real unit labour cost in the private sector 
(annual growth rate)
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chart 12
sectoral bankruptcy rates
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4  MonetaRy anD financial conDitions
chart 13
long-term default risk and forward premium of Hungary
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chart 15
HUf/eUR, HUf/UsD and HUf/cHf exchange rates compared 
to January 3, 2005
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chart 14
three-month eUR, UsD, cHf and HUf money market 
interest rates 
(LIBOR and BUBOR fixing)
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chart 17
interest rate premium of new loans to non-financial 
enterprises
(over 3-month BUBOR and EURIBOR, respectively, 3-month moving average)
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chart 18
interest rate premium of new HUf loans to households 
(over 3-month BUBOR)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Ja
n.
 0
5
A
pr
. 
05
Ju
ly
  
05
O
ct
. 
05
Ja
n.
 0
6
A
pr
. 
06
Ju
ly
  
06
O
ct
. 
06
Ja
n.
 0
7
A
pr
. 
07
Ju
ly
  
07
O
ct
. 
07
Ja
n.
 0
8
A
pr
. 
08
Ju
ly
  
08
O
ct
. 
08
Ja
n.
 0
9
A
pr
. 
09
Ju
ly
  
09
O
ct
. 
09
Ja
n.
 1
0
A
pr
. 
10
Ju
ly
  
10
O
ct
. 
10
Ja
n.
 1
1
A
pr
. 
11
Ju
ly
  
11
O
ct
. 
11
Percentage point Percentage point
Housing loan
Home equity loan
Personal loan
Source: MNB.
chart 16
volatility of the HUf/eUR exchange rate
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chart 19
fHb housing-price index 
(2000 = 100)
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5  pRices of instRUMents
chart 20
annualised yields on government securities’ indices and 
money markets
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chart 21
annual yield of key Hungarian and central and eastern 
european stock market indices
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6  RisKs of tHe financial inteRMeDiaRy systeM
chart 22
indebtedness of non-financial enterprises as a percentage 
of gDp
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chart 24
annual growth rate of loans provided to non-financial 
corporations by domestic banks
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chart 23
Denomination structure of domestic bank loans of  
non-financial enterprises
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chart 25
net quarterly change of bank loan volumes of non-financial 
enterprises
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chart 26
Quality of the corporate loan portfolio
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chart 27
provisioning on loans of non-financial corporations by 
industry
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chart 28
indebtedness of households in international comparison
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chart 30
annual growth rate of total household loans
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chart 29
Debt service burden of the household sector
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chart 31
net quarterly change of bank loan volumes of households 
by main products and currencies, adjusted for exchange 
rate changes
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chart 32
Household loans distribution by denomination
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chart 33
Household loans distribution by collateral
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chart 34
Distribution of new housing loans by ltv
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chart 36
comparison of instalment payments of cHf- and HUf- 
denominated housing loans
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chart 35
Quality of the household loan portfolio
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chart 37
provisioning on household loans
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chart 38
open fX position of the domestic banking sector
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banking sector's exchange rate exposure
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chart 40
90-day re-pricing gap of the banking sector
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chart 42
liquidity index
(exponentially weighted moving average)
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chart 41
estimated maximum loss based on interest rate risk stress 
tests relative to equity
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chart 43
liquidity sub-indices 
(exponentially weighted moving average)
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chart 44
bid-ask spread indices of the major domestic financial 
markets 
(exponentially weighted moving average)
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chart 45
credit to deposit ratio of the banking sector
(adjusted for exchange rate changes)
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chart 46
liquidity ratios of the banking sector
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chart 48
Roa, Roe and real Roe of the banking sector
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chart 47
external funds of the banking sector
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chart 49
Dispersion of banks' total assets by Roe
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chart 50
banking sector spread and its components
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chart 51
operating efficiency indicators of the banking sector
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chart 52
banks’ capital adequacy ratios
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chart 54
liquidity needed for settling ibc-turnover as a percentage 
of available liquidity and uncovered transactions as a 
percentage of the turnover
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chart 53
Dispersion of banks' minimum capital requirement by 
capital adequacy ratio
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chart 55
Monthly turnover/liquidity ratio (vibeR) and monthly 
turnover and queue statistics
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chart 56
availability of domestic overseen systems (ibc, KeleR, 
vibeR)
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notes to the appendix
The chart date (e.g. 2008) means the end of the year (the 
31st of December) if it’s not indicated otherwise.
chart 1:
The increased value of the indicator indicates declining risk 
appetite or increasing risk aversion.
chart 2:
vIX: implied volatility of S&P 500.
MOvE: implied volatility of US Treasuries (Merrill Lynch).
chart 3:
The increased value of the indicator indicates declining risk 
appetite or increasing risk aversion.
chart 4:
General government: according to SNA methodology.
Corporate sector and “error”: the financing requirement of 
corporate sector is calculated as a residual, so it includes 
errors.
External financing requirement: adjusted by the difference 
caused by imports brought forward on account of EU 
accession and by the import increasing impact generated by 
customs warehouses terminated due to EU accession and 
Gripen acquisitions.
chart 10: 
Disposable income is estimated by MNB using the 
consumption, investment and financial savings data of 
households.
chart 12: 
Number of bankruptcy proceedings of legal entities, 
summed according to the date of publication, cumulated for 
4 quarters, divided by the number of legal entities 
operating a year before.
chart 13: 
The 5-year forward forint risk premium as of 5 years from 
now, compared to the euro forward yield (3-day moving 
average) and the 5-year Hungarian credit default swap 
spread.
chart 16:
Historic volatility: weighted historic volatility of the 
exchange rate (GARCH method).
Implied volatility: implied volatility of quoted 30-day ATM 
FX options. 
chart 19: 
FHB House Price Index.
chart 24:
FX loans, exchange rate as of end-December 2000, HUF 
loans adjusted by state loan refinancing in December 2002.
chart 25:
FX loans on December 2000, end of month exchange rate.
chart 38: 
An increase in the swap stock stands for swaps with a long 
forint spot leg. Based on the daily FX reports of credit 
institutions. Calculated from swap transactions between 
credit institutions and non-resident investors. The MNB 
does not take responsibility for the accuracy of the data. 
Revisions due reporting errors and non-standard transactions 
can lead to significant subsequent modifications of the data 
series. The data series does not include swap transactions 
between branches, specialised credit institutions, 
cooperative credit institutions and non-resident investors. 
The swap stock is the sum of termin legs calculated at 
actual foreign exchange rates.
chart 41: 
The interest rate risk stress test indicates the projected 
result of an extreme interest rate event; in this scenario 
this event is a parallel upward shift of the yield curve by 
500 basis points for the forint, and by 200 basis points for 
the euro, the US dollar, and the Swiss franc. For the 
calculations we applied re-pricing data and the Macaulay 
duration derived from them.
chart 42: 
A rise in the liquidity index indicates an improvement in the 
liquidity of the financial markets.
chart 43: 
Similarly to the liquidity index, increase in liquidity sub-
indices suggests an improvement in the given dimension of 
liquidity.
chart 44: 
A rise in the indices represents narrowing bid-ask spread, 
thus an increase in the tightness and liquidity of the 
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market. The liquidity index of HUF FX-swap market includes 
the data of USD/HUF and EUR/HUF segments, taking into 
account of tom-next, overnight and spot-next transactions. 
The earlier version of the liquidity index included only the 
tom-next USD/HUF transactions.
chart 45: 
Client loans include loans and bonds of non-financial 
institutions, household loans, loans and bonds of financial 
and investment enterprises, government loans, municipal 
loans and municipal bonds. Client deposits include the 
deposits of non-financial institutions, household deposits, 
deposits of money market funds, deposits of financial and 
investment enterprises, government deposits and municipal 
deposits. The loan-to deposit ratio is exchange-rate-
adjusted with respect to the last period.
chart 46: 
Funding gap is the difference between the exchange rate 
adjusted customer credit and deposit, divided by the 
exchange rate adjusted customer credit.
chart 48: 
ROE: pre-tax profit / average (equity − balance sheet 
profit).
ROA: pre-tax profit / average total assets.
Interim data are annualised.
Pre-tax profit: previous 12 months.
Average total assets: mean of previous 12 months.
Average (equity − balance sheet profit/ loss): 12 month 
moving average.
Deflator: previous year same month=100 CPI (%).
chart 49: 
Pre-tax profit.
chart 50: 
Interim data are annualised.
Interest income: previous 12 months
Interest expenditure: previous 12 months
Average interest bearing assets: mean of previous 12 
months
Average interest bearing liabilities: mean of previous 12 
months
chart 51: 
Cost: previous 12 months
Income: previous 12 months
Average total asset: mean of previous 12 months
chart 52: 
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) = (total own funds for solvency 
purposes/minimum capital requirement)*8%
Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio = (tier 1 capital after 
deductions/minimum capital requirement)*8%
chart 55:
Start-of-day balance adjustments and central bank payments 
are excluded. 
chart 56:
Due to differences in the nature of the overseen systems 
and in the calculation methodology, comparing the 
availability ratios can be misleading. The calculation 
methodology for the availability ratio for KELER was 
changed in January 2008. The ratios based on the new and 
old methodologies are not comparable, which is why we will 
publish the data based on the new methods for KELER in 
separate time-series.
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